The Rise and Fall of Saudi Arabia….

 Intelligence Insight

There is no Arab country in the Middle East with which the United States is as knotted as Saudi Arabia. In the first half of the twentieth century, American oil companies ensured the rise of the House of Saud and its legitimacy to rule over the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia has been important to the United States because of its super-giant oilfields and very high production capacities. The United States has a national security interest in being granted a ready access to energy supplies from the Persian Gulf, most of which are controlled by the Kingdom. So, it has been – and will remain – America’s ally as long as the United States needs as much oil. Beyond the shadow of a doubt, the key rationale justifying US-Saudi ties is oil. The Kingdom needs to export its oil, while the United States, whose oil output peaked in the early years of the 1970s, is increasingly dependent on foreign oil supplies. Nonetheless, the Cold War has given a golden context to thicken their partnership from oil business to strategic cooperation. Both countries perceived the Soviet Union as an imminent threat to their respective interests. Therefore, the Cold War opened a new era of broadened cooperation between the two allies. But, the end of the Soviet threat removed most of the rationale for such a close partnership. What’s more, the withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan made most Jihadists “jobless”. But, they had another item on their agenda: after they defeated the Soviet Army, they started to target the “unfaithful” Westerners, mainly embodied by the United States. When King Fahd “invited” American forces to drive out Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, and deter any further Iraqi expansion, from the Saudi territory, those Afghan fighters responded to the calls of Al-Qaeda’s leader Osama Ben Laden to fight against the presence of Westerners in the Kingdom – the custodian of the holy places.

Ben Laden has always been in opposition to the US-Saudi alliance, and has always campaigned against it. On September 11, Ben Laden almost reached his goal, since the attacks opened a phase of distrust between the two peoples. But, driven by continuous shared interests, the relationship between the elite members has not been importantly damaged. Quite obviously, American and Saudi leaders share interests that are beyond any common perception for their citizens. Before 9/11, their relations had already experienced ups and downs, but never broke. After 9/11, American and Saudi leaders were confronted to a dilemma: to pursue their close alliance without discrediting themselves on their domestic political stage. As a consequence, both countries experiencing a change in their alliance but no divorce is going to take place on the short run. The House of Saud has a great national security concern in preserving its legitimacy; particularly in a context where the fundamentalist voice finds resonance among the young and bored people.

The ability of the Kingdom to lead reforms will shape the future of its relationship with the United States and its influence in the Middle East, as well as its internal stability. Although King Abdullah recognized the need for reforms, his main concern was that moving too fast would upset Saudi domestic balance. It is worth reminding that tensions between modernization and conservatism first appeared in the wake of the unprecedented affluence of the early 1970s.

The United States couldn’t at that time run the risk of provoking instability in the Kingdom as a result of immoderate reforms, but Saudi Arabia should have had  introduced reforms gradually in a view to find adequacy between its predominantly 28 conservative society and modernizing economy.
Instability in the Kingdom would send oil prices through the roof, not only because Saudi Arabia has got the largest oil reserves on earth but also because of its role as a residual producer. Today, Saudi Arabia’s production reaches more than 9 million bpd. No other country in the Middle East and on earth is capable of such a high production and countering the effects of an oil market disruption. Throughout history, Saudi Arabia has proven itself a reliable residual producer, replacing Iranian oil during the 1979 crisis as well as Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil outputs in the aftermaths of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the following US oil embargo on Iraq.

However, a certain number of people from the conservative wing of US politics have put forward the idea of dismembering the Kingdom into several parts, thus gaining a free access to the oilfields, putting the holy sites under an international Islamic authority and abandoning the royal family deep in the heart of its native desert. This hardly-conceivable scenario of a regional reshaping was received with indignation inside the Kingdom, and within the royal family members, some have been appealed to look the other way. But, on both sides, leaders have been caught up with realism and pragmatism. After all, Saudi Arabia would not become hostile to the United States, its only protector. 

And who could ever replace the House of Saud as the leader of the country holding its name? The United States does not beneficiate from any sufficient legitimacy to be allowed to lead such a reckless adventure without jeopardizing its homeland security. America could choose to distance itself from the Kingdom, thus putting at risk the royal family, and as a consequence, energy supplies. Nonetheless, change has appeared to be a necessary endeavor for both nations. Not only, Saudi Arabia was interested in moderating its partnership with the United States, but, in order to overcome the many challenges with which the Kingdom has to deal, it has undertook a vast venture of modernization and economic diversification. As every nation in the world which has realized the necessity to think on a global fashion, Saudi Arabia has cornered toward more diversified and more eastward ambitions.

It is now more interested in fulfilling its own goals rather than pursuing an all-exclusive partnership with the United States. And, growing global energy demands provide Saudi Arabia with opportunities that were not available in the past. But, as long as the Saudi leadership is persuaded that it cannot do without American protection, the Kingdom will remain extremely dependent on the United States. Currently, no other country equals the United States as a military superpower.

It is likely to remain so for decades as China, Russia, or even the European Union are yet to be in the military contest with the United States. The US administration  fully aware it cannot do without Saudi Arabia, either. Despite its rhetoric on the necessity to reduce dependency on Middle Eastern oil, the United States, as a top oil consumer on earth, will remain extremely dependent on the largest oilfields in the world. And, they are located in Saudi Arabia. So long as industrialized countries do not move toward renewable energy sources, they will remain extremely dependent on the Persian Gulf oil.

On a strategic level of analysis, Saudi Arabia has become more inclined to oppose the United States when its vision appears to be divergent. Imposing democracy by force has resulted particularly perilous for the United States. Saudi Arabia did oppose the US-designed military 29 intervention in Iraq for it would result in a regional chaos. Actually, even if the Saudi leadership considered Saddam Hussein a trouble-maker, they could not reasonably appear as backing the US ambition to overthrow a neighboring Arab leader, without running the serious risk of being targeted by Al-Qaeda followers.

In any case, Saudi Arabia has always preferred stability and status quo in the Middle East to regime change, probably fearing the day when its proper regime would be forced to change, as well as the spread of instability into the Kingdom. The United States has learnt, through the Iraqi turmoil, that imposing democracy in the Middle East is not an easy task. Today, the Americans seem to share the Kingdom’s vision that stability is more important than democracy.

Saudi Arabia opposed President Bush’s vision regarding Iran. Certainly, both Washington and Riyadh are deeply concerned with the Iranian nuclear program. But, what Saudi Arabia fears the most is a new war in the region. When President Bush toured the Middle East in January 2008, he chose the worst moment to talk about a coalition against Iran. Year 2008, Saudi Arabia and its smaller neighbors have increased diplomatic contacts with the Islamic Republic and tried to maintain neighborly relations. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was invited at the GCC summit and the Hajj in December 2007. The invitation to the summit aimed at reassuring GCC members about Iran’s nuclear program, but Ahmadinejad reaffirmed his country’s determination to pursue uranium enrichment. Gulf countries were worried about Iran’s rising influence in the Middle East, but still, do not imagine attacking its neighbor across from the Persian Gulf.

Firstly, Iran is also a domestic issue for Gulf countries, as they fear an upheaval of their Shiite minorities in the case Iran would be attacked. In this respect, Gulf countries have improved the situation of those traditionally discriminated minorities in an attempt to deter Iran’s influence and preserve civil peace.

Secondly, any attacks in the Persian Gulf at that time would have a disastrous effect on oil prices, due to effective shortages and the volatility which characterizes this opaque market. If high oil prices certainly produce benefits to oil-exporting countries, extremely high prices have a negative impact on oil-consuming nations and would strongly affect global economic activities. Furthermore, raising production so rapidly in response to a shortage would irreversibly damage Saudi oil reservoirs.

Finally, even if Saudi Arabia and the United States share the same concern about Iran’s nuclear program, the former cannot appear as a US ally in any air campaign against Iran’s nuclear sites.
Simply, America’s failing legitimacy in the Middle East puts the Kingdom in an awkward position, domestically and regionally. For they are trapped in Iraq, US forces no longer give the image of a strong military able to protect the Kingdom in the case of a Shiite uprising, let alone going to war against Iran. Also, the very sophisticated Saudi army has never proven to be efficient on its own. Surely, the United States enjoys a privilege by being such a close friend to Saudi Arabia.

Off the record, Saudi Arabia provided US forces with logistical support to overthrow Saddam Hussein in 2003 to a far greater extent than what was publicly acknowledged. The Kingdom is also a top customer to US billion-dollar arms sales. But, the United States aware that an increasing number of countries are looking toward the Kingdom for its comparative advantage – oil. In addition, less wealthy Arab and Muslim countries turn to their Persian Gulf fellows to ask for investments, which is amicably agreed by the latter for it is a means to 30 extend their influence. Saudi Arabia’s influence in the Middle East is undeniable. But it has to put up with an increasing number of competitors, first of which Iran. Within the Arabian Peninsula, the Kingdom has long overshadowed the smaller oil-exporting countries, which are steadily gaining a foothold on the regional stage, and America’s interest. As for Iran, the two rivals have yearned for being first in the Middle East ranking. Riyadh supports Abu Dhabi in its Abu Musa and Tunb islands dispute with Tehran. Saudi leaders were  greatly concerned with the negative impact Iran’s growing influence has in the Near-East conflict, in Iraq, and in Lebanese affairs.

However, due to President Bush’s “hardly-earned” unpopularity and the waiting for a change in the US administration, many Middle East issues are likely to remain pending until the early 2009. Making progress toward peace between Israel and the Palestinians, stabilizing Iraq and Lebanon, and avoiding confrontation with Iran would help reduce the effects of anti-Americanism in the region.

Beyond oil, there are many reasons why the United States and Saudi Arabia continued working together. In May 2003, terrorism became a reality for the Kingdom. Even if Saudi Arabia has been slow to recognize how serious the threat is, it has understood that fighting terrorism requires close cooperation with the United States. The two countries worked  hand-in-hand to hunt down Al-Qaeda cells. FBI and CIA agents actually collaborate with Saudi authorities in an almost unprecedented way to help modernize Saudi national security operations. In return, the United States needs the Saudis to help reduce terrorists’ ability to manipulate Islamic and Arab causes. In this respect, the United States should have encouraged Saudi Arabia to support moderate and tolerant Islam inside and outside its territory, as the Kingdom is the custodian of Islam’s most important holy sites. More than counterterrorism, both countries have a common interest in the stability of the Kingdom on the long run. Economic, social, and political reforms should not been imposed by the United States, but quietly encouraged. Saudi Arabia should move at its own pace. Undoubtedly, the Iraqi quagmire has proven how imposing change can be counterproductive. Complete absence of US support made problems worse.

Saudis should have put emphasis on reforming the educational system, which is a long-term investment in modernization, prosperity, and stability. It is also a bridge to a more open dialogue between different cultures and civilizations in a view to reinforce shared values.

Backgrounder on Saudi Educational System
Since the 1960s Saudi Arabia has become the biggest exporter of Islamic education. This development has been driven by certain domestic and global political turning points, beginning with the so-called Arab Cold War, in which socialist Egypt, under President Gamal Abd al-Nasser, and Saudi Arabia used educational institutions to battle for ideological hegemony.

In 1961, Egypt’s Law No. 103 was enacted to nationalize and centralize Cairo’s tradition-steeped Islamic al-Azhar University. The reform granted al-Azhar scholars control of the Islamic heritage and encouraged them to proselytize abroad. Al-Azhar was declared the center for propagating Islam and Nasser’s Arab-Socialist vision of pan-Arabism. This was a frontal attack on Saudi Arabia’s religious and political status within the Muslim world; in reaction and as a countering institution to al-Azhar, the Islamic University of Medina was founded that same year.

Wahhabi scholars run the university; from the beginning, the stated goal was the international mission, which today occurs mostly through generous scholarships for foreign students.
 The Muslim World League, officially a nongovernmental organization, was founded in 1962. With Saudis in all major positions and the Saudi state by far the League’s largest funder, it is effectively an institution of Saudi foreign policy.

The Muslim World League maintains a global network of educational establishments, cultural centers, mosques, publishing companies, and aid organizations that promote Wahhabi/Salafi Islam and legitimize Saudi rule. The League’s ability to foment or stoke religious conflicts is viewed critically (Steinberg 2004).
When, in 1973, oil brought wealth to Saudi Arabia, Faisal invested in the Muslim World League. Saudi Arabia’s new prosperity allowed the kingdom to demonstrate its leadership of the Muslim world by becoming the largest funder of transnational educational institutions for propagating the Wahhabi worldview and Saudi political propaganda – and thus to secure alliances. Saudi Arabia became the world’s premier exporter of Islamic education.

In Riyadh in 1974, the Imam Muhammad bin Saud University was founded; with the Islamic Universities in Mecca and Medina, it formed the core of the Saudi religious university system, and it developed into the largest Wahhabi educational institution in the country. To this day it trains most of the country’s scholars: judges, imams, religious teachers, missionaries, and function aries of the religious police. It has five international branches – in the Emirate Ras alKhaimah, Djibouti, Tokyo, Fairfax (USA), and Jakarta – and grants a large number of scholarships to foreigners to study Islam in Riyadh. Since 1979 and Iran’s Islamic revolution, transnational educational institutions have become much more significant for Saudi foreign policy. The Iranian revolution ended Saudi Arabia’s supremacy in the Islamic world: The Shiite theocracy strives to deprive the Saudi regime of its legitimacy and its role as protector of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia must always reckon with uprisings of its own repressed Shia population. In the Saudi/Iranian struggle for hegemony, Saudi educational institutions play a major role in repressing Shia Islam in other countries and establishing international ideological alliances.

Rethinking of the Educational Paradigm in Saudi Arabia post 9/11

 9/11 has sparked a keen interest in the educational system in KSA and the ideological imbedded political and religious regimes which may single out its unique educational paradigm.
The political implications of 9/11 notwithstanding, curriculum reform in KSA is considered essential by many experts in order “to meet demands of the employment market, reform initiatives so far have largely shied away from controversial issues such as reducing the overall percentage of religious education” (Aarts & Nonneman, 2005, p79).

Curriculum reform advocates, many from abroad, but mostly from within KSA, such as (Al-Attas, 1979; Al-Ajroush,1980; Zaid, 1994; Al-Hazmi, 2003; Elyas, 2008, Elyas & Picard 2010; Almziny, 2010) have advocated for an urgent action to reform the education before it is too late. For example, Alessa (BBC) argues that “the education system in the Kingdom needs to be encouraged to implement a new educational philosophy based  on the balance between faith and ethics” (p104). This issue of the “save harbors” and of the legitimacy of education lead to questioning the philosophy and policy of education in KSA which have encountered some opposition from intellectuals in KSA. Elyas & Picard (2010) for example, has criticized the education system in KSA where he argues for the necessity to amend the philosophical approach and education policy in KSA. Almziny also claims that “the Saudi methods of education inculcate in students a culture of death for which they have little use in their daily lives,” (p.50) a hollow cry which has been called for many years in the past.

References

• The Asian Conference on Language Learning 2013 Official Conference Proceedings
• Georges H.W. BUSH, “Toward a New World Order”. Speech given to a joint session of the
• United States Congress, Washington D.C. on 11 September 1990,
• http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Toward_a_New_World_Order
• Center for Religious Freedom of Freedom House (ed.) (2006), Update: Saudi Arabia´s Curriculum of Intolerance, online: (22 June 2014).
• Groiss, Arnon (2003), The West, Christians, and Jews in Saudi Arabian Schoolbooks, New York: Center For Monitoring The Impact of Peace, online: <www.impact-se.org/docs/reports/ SA/SA2003.pdf>(22 June 2014).
• Human Rights Watch (2013), In Religion’s Name: Abuses against Religious Minorities in Indonesia, online: (22 June 2014).
• Said, Behnam T., and Hazim Fouad (2014), Salafismus: Auf der Suche nach dem wahren Islam [Salafism: In Search of the True Islam], Freiburg: Herder Verlag.
• themwl.org
• oic-oic.org
• Al-Essa, A. (2009). Education Reform in Saudi Arabia between Absence of Political Vision, Apprehesion of the Religious Culture and Disability of Educatinal اصلاح التعليم في السعودية بين غياب الرؤية السياسية وتوجس الثقافة الدينية –Managment التربوية الادارة وعجز. (First ed.). Beirut: Dar AlSakee.
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