İsa Afacan
In a report for the members and committees of the US Congress, Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service succinctly chronicled the post-Saddam Hussein political transition in Iraq and recounts the current state of disarray in Iraqi politics and security. Katzman argues that sectarian and ethnic strife in Iraq resurfaced after the US military departure in 2011, thereby exacerbating Iraq’s already shaky stability. Feeling marginalized and even sidelined by the new architecture of the Shiite-dominated Iraqi state, the majority of Sunni Arabs seem supportive of radical jihadis like Islamic State as a reaction against the Shia dominance of power.
After former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s divisive policies, current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi took some majors initiatives to alleviate Sunni resentment, such as passing a law to reintegrate former Ba’ath Party members in the central government and lifting the Baghdad curfew. However, Abadi seems helplessly caught between rival camps and he “remains dependent politically and militarily on the Shiite militias. […] [Abadi’s] attempts to address Sunni demands have also caused agitation among the government’s core Shiite base.” In addition, Iraqi Kurds are striving to consolidate their de facto state within Iraq while dealing with the threat of Islamic State, which has hindered their road to independence.
In such a state of disarray and chaos, Katzman lays out in his report the extent and scope of US involvement to stabilize Iraqi unity and defeat Islamic State. The US sold Iraq a large number of “Hellfire” air-to-surface missiles for use against Islamic State and has supplied at least 5,000 missiles to date. The training of Iraqi combat pilots is done in Arizona and 36 F-16 fighter jets will be delivered to Baghdad by the end of this year. The US Congress has also approved the sale and lease of 30 Apache attack helicopters, 200 Humvees and other military equipment, and Iraq has purchased several unmanned aerial vehicles to enhance surveillance capabilities against Islamic State. In addition, the US has sent 3,100 military personnel to train and advise the Iraqi army -- known as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) -- as well as Kurdish Peshmerga forces and Sunni tribal militias.
Despite Abadi’s reconciliation efforts and the US involvement, Islamic State presence and even its advance in Iraq has not been thwarted. One of the key reasons, Katzman argues, is that “there has not, to date, been a noticeable major shift of Sunnis to support of the Iraqi government.” This means returning Sunnis to Iraqi politics is crucial not only for defeating Islamic State but also for a unified Iraqi state.
The second report, by Kenneth M. Pollack of the Brookings Institution, sheds light on Iraq’s military situation. Despite the fact that it was written almost a year ago, it retains deep insight into the dynamics of the Iraqi military and political spheres. Pollack argues that there are three likely scenarios regarding the Islamic State advance in Iraq: stalemate near Baghdad; Sunni militants capturing Baghdad and advancing deep into the Shiite heartland of south Iraq; and Shiite militias driving Sunni fighters out of their recent conquests. The most likely scenario for Pollack is a “rapid Sunni militant advance [that] is likely to be stalemated at or north of Baghdad, basically along Iraq’s ethno-sectarian divide.” The reason is that Baghdad has become a more Shiite city following the 2006-2008 civil war, with around 75-80 percent of its population estimated to be Shiite.
Pollack warns that situation in Anbar should be monitored carefully so as to predict Islamic State’s next move, and one should also keep an eye on Iranian participation in Iraqi defense through its Quds force, which could tip the stalemate. Pollack also makes an unconventional and interesting assessment of Sunni militants:
(1) It is a coalition, not a single group. Pollack underlines it is incorrect consider Islamic State as the only group waging war against the central Iraqi government and the Kurds. Rather, it is a part of larger Sunni Arab coalition estranged by the highly sectarian measures of the Maliki government.
(2) It is an Iraqi entity, not a foreign invasion. While Pollack acknowledges some foreign elements in Islamic State, he says that the background of the Sunni militants is overwhelmingly Iraqi. Sunni militants are “busily engaged in recruiting and training additional Sunni Iraqis which is simply reinforcing the Iraqi nature of the group,” adding that Islamic State ‘is only one piece (albeit, the central piece) in a larger array of Sunni groups that are overwhelmingly Iraqi.”
(3) These are militias first and foremost and terrorists only a distant second. Pollack sees the phenomenon in Iraq as a “traditional ethno-sectarian militia waging an intercommunal civil war.” Regarding the Islamic State advance in Iraq, he says it “has been a conventional, motorized light-infantry offensive; not a terrorist campaign, not a guerrilla warfare campaign.”
He then further explicates his reasoning: “Seeing them for what they are, first and foremost a sectarian militia waging a civil war, puts the emphasis on where it needs to be: finding an integrated political-military solution to the internal Iraqi problems that sparked the civil war. And that is a set of problems that is unlikely to be solved by immediate, direct American attacks on the Sunni militants. Indeed, such attacks could easily make the situation worse.”
Concerning the ISF, Pollack contends that it has become too Shiite through the policies of the Maliki government and that is why most Sunni Arabs and Kurds, according to Pollock, call the ISF “Maliki’s militia.” For Pollock, a major part of the problem is that the ISF has become heavily politicized and sectarian, driving out Sunni Arabs and Kurds. He therefore says that “any American military assistance to Iraq must be conditioned on concrete changes in Iraq’s political structure to bring the Sunnis back in and limit the powers of the (Shia) prime minister, coupled with a thorough depoliticization of the ISF.”
The third report was published by Chatham House in July 2013 and deals with the issue of Iraq’s foreign policy. The report puts forward the idea that Iraq has been a mainstay of Middle Eastern politics for many decades, like Syria and Egypt. The report describes their recent absence from regional politics due to their challenges in domestic affairs as an “historical anomaly” due to recent domestic events. For Iraq, the experiences of occupation and the post-occupation transition has enabled other countries and non-state actors to penetrate the country to provide them with alliances with internal factions. According to the report, “This factional alliance-building reinforces the structural deficiencies of domestic state institutions and complicates efforts to develop consensus on foreign policy.”
The authors also claim that Iraqi foreign policy is highly polarized and factionalized along ethnic and sectarian lines. The majority Shiite paradigm sees Iraq as engaged in the process of democratization, despite other regional countries trying to block its achievements. The report asserts that this paradigm is deeply disturbed by the overthrow of the Syrian regime; it considers the nature of the regime change anathematic to Iraqi Shiites’ democratization argument. By contrast, the minority Sunni group is not comfortable with the Maliki government’s pro-Iranian stance in regional politics.
Moreover, through the federally mandated Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Kurds are pursuing a de facto independent foreign policy that could eventually lead to complete autonomy, meaning independence. The report asserts: “Iraqi political players still use the country’s foreign relations principally as a means to gain power within the state, rather than to further the country’s interests in the region. Both the conflict in Syria and the political violence in Iraq are partly shaped by the legacy of authoritarian governments that relied heavily on coercion and refused to permit space for effective opposition to develop peacefully.” It seems that reconciliation, mutual understanding and cooperation among rival factions are not the default mode; rather, suspicion, hatred and tribal and sectarian motives are generally in the driving seat.
The Chatham House report urges all parties to seek “a position of non-alignment and non-interference in an increasingly conflicted region.” For the authors, Syria poses the most important risk for Iraq and therefore Iraqi factions should adopt a position of non-alignment and non-interference to ward off any spillover into Iraq. This prudent approach, laid out in July 2013, was not heeded. Writing in May 2015, the future of a unified Iraq seems very much in question.
In a report for the members and committees of the US Congress, Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service succinctly chronicled the post-Saddam Hussein political transition in Iraq and recounts the current state of disarray in Iraqi politics and security. Katzman argues that sectarian and ethnic strife in Iraq resurfaced after the US military departure in 2011, thereby exacerbating Iraq’s already shaky stability. Feeling marginalized and even sidelined by the new architecture of the Shiite-dominated Iraqi state, the majority of Sunni Arabs seem supportive of radical jihadis like Islamic State as a reaction against the Shia dominance of power.
After former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s divisive policies, current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi took some majors initiatives to alleviate Sunni resentment, such as passing a law to reintegrate former Ba’ath Party members in the central government and lifting the Baghdad curfew. However, Abadi seems helplessly caught between rival camps and he “remains dependent politically and militarily on the Shiite militias. […] [Abadi’s] attempts to address Sunni demands have also caused agitation among the government’s core Shiite base.” In addition, Iraqi Kurds are striving to consolidate their de facto state within Iraq while dealing with the threat of Islamic State, which has hindered their road to independence.
In such a state of disarray and chaos, Katzman lays out in his report the extent and scope of US involvement to stabilize Iraqi unity and defeat Islamic State. The US sold Iraq a large number of “Hellfire” air-to-surface missiles for use against Islamic State and has supplied at least 5,000 missiles to date. The training of Iraqi combat pilots is done in Arizona and 36 F-16 fighter jets will be delivered to Baghdad by the end of this year. The US Congress has also approved the sale and lease of 30 Apache attack helicopters, 200 Humvees and other military equipment, and Iraq has purchased several unmanned aerial vehicles to enhance surveillance capabilities against Islamic State. In addition, the US has sent 3,100 military personnel to train and advise the Iraqi army -- known as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) -- as well as Kurdish Peshmerga forces and Sunni tribal militias.
Despite Abadi’s reconciliation efforts and the US involvement, Islamic State presence and even its advance in Iraq has not been thwarted. One of the key reasons, Katzman argues, is that “there has not, to date, been a noticeable major shift of Sunnis to support of the Iraqi government.” This means returning Sunnis to Iraqi politics is crucial not only for defeating Islamic State but also for a unified Iraqi state.
The second report, by Kenneth M. Pollack of the Brookings Institution, sheds light on Iraq’s military situation. Despite the fact that it was written almost a year ago, it retains deep insight into the dynamics of the Iraqi military and political spheres. Pollack argues that there are three likely scenarios regarding the Islamic State advance in Iraq: stalemate near Baghdad; Sunni militants capturing Baghdad and advancing deep into the Shiite heartland of south Iraq; and Shiite militias driving Sunni fighters out of their recent conquests. The most likely scenario for Pollack is a “rapid Sunni militant advance [that] is likely to be stalemated at or north of Baghdad, basically along Iraq’s ethno-sectarian divide.” The reason is that Baghdad has become a more Shiite city following the 2006-2008 civil war, with around 75-80 percent of its population estimated to be Shiite.
Pollack warns that situation in Anbar should be monitored carefully so as to predict Islamic State’s next move, and one should also keep an eye on Iranian participation in Iraqi defense through its Quds force, which could tip the stalemate. Pollack also makes an unconventional and interesting assessment of Sunni militants:
(1) It is a coalition, not a single group. Pollack underlines it is incorrect consider Islamic State as the only group waging war against the central Iraqi government and the Kurds. Rather, it is a part of larger Sunni Arab coalition estranged by the highly sectarian measures of the Maliki government.
(2) It is an Iraqi entity, not a foreign invasion. While Pollack acknowledges some foreign elements in Islamic State, he says that the background of the Sunni militants is overwhelmingly Iraqi. Sunni militants are “busily engaged in recruiting and training additional Sunni Iraqis which is simply reinforcing the Iraqi nature of the group,” adding that Islamic State ‘is only one piece (albeit, the central piece) in a larger array of Sunni groups that are overwhelmingly Iraqi.”
(3) These are militias first and foremost and terrorists only a distant second. Pollack sees the phenomenon in Iraq as a “traditional ethno-sectarian militia waging an intercommunal civil war.” Regarding the Islamic State advance in Iraq, he says it “has been a conventional, motorized light-infantry offensive; not a terrorist campaign, not a guerrilla warfare campaign.”
He then further explicates his reasoning: “Seeing them for what they are, first and foremost a sectarian militia waging a civil war, puts the emphasis on where it needs to be: finding an integrated political-military solution to the internal Iraqi problems that sparked the civil war. And that is a set of problems that is unlikely to be solved by immediate, direct American attacks on the Sunni militants. Indeed, such attacks could easily make the situation worse.”
Concerning the ISF, Pollack contends that it has become too Shiite through the policies of the Maliki government and that is why most Sunni Arabs and Kurds, according to Pollock, call the ISF “Maliki’s militia.” For Pollock, a major part of the problem is that the ISF has become heavily politicized and sectarian, driving out Sunni Arabs and Kurds. He therefore says that “any American military assistance to Iraq must be conditioned on concrete changes in Iraq’s political structure to bring the Sunnis back in and limit the powers of the (Shia) prime minister, coupled with a thorough depoliticization of the ISF.”
The third report was published by Chatham House in July 2013 and deals with the issue of Iraq’s foreign policy. The report puts forward the idea that Iraq has been a mainstay of Middle Eastern politics for many decades, like Syria and Egypt. The report describes their recent absence from regional politics due to their challenges in domestic affairs as an “historical anomaly” due to recent domestic events. For Iraq, the experiences of occupation and the post-occupation transition has enabled other countries and non-state actors to penetrate the country to provide them with alliances with internal factions. According to the report, “This factional alliance-building reinforces the structural deficiencies of domestic state institutions and complicates efforts to develop consensus on foreign policy.”
The authors also claim that Iraqi foreign policy is highly polarized and factionalized along ethnic and sectarian lines. The majority Shiite paradigm sees Iraq as engaged in the process of democratization, despite other regional countries trying to block its achievements. The report asserts that this paradigm is deeply disturbed by the overthrow of the Syrian regime; it considers the nature of the regime change anathematic to Iraqi Shiites’ democratization argument. By contrast, the minority Sunni group is not comfortable with the Maliki government’s pro-Iranian stance in regional politics.
Moreover, through the federally mandated Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Kurds are pursuing a de facto independent foreign policy that could eventually lead to complete autonomy, meaning independence. The report asserts: “Iraqi political players still use the country’s foreign relations principally as a means to gain power within the state, rather than to further the country’s interests in the region. Both the conflict in Syria and the political violence in Iraq are partly shaped by the legacy of authoritarian governments that relied heavily on coercion and refused to permit space for effective opposition to develop peacefully.” It seems that reconciliation, mutual understanding and cooperation among rival factions are not the default mode; rather, suspicion, hatred and tribal and sectarian motives are generally in the driving seat.
The Chatham House report urges all parties to seek “a position of non-alignment and non-interference in an increasingly conflicted region.” For the authors, Syria poses the most important risk for Iraq and therefore Iraqi factions should adopt a position of non-alignment and non-interference to ward off any spillover into Iraq. This prudent approach, laid out in July 2013, was not heeded. Writing in May 2015, the future of a unified Iraq seems very much in question.
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