The Anatomy of the Kurdish-Turkish Solution Process

22 August, 2015
By Amed Dicle

The original title of this title ‘The anatomy of a process; who knocked over the Imrali table. It was originally published on ANF in Turkish.

The visit of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) MPs Ahmet Turk and Ayla Akat Ata to the island of Imrali on the 3rd of January in 2013 took the previously initiated meetings between Abdullah Ocalan and state officials to a new level.
Since the 27th of July, 2011, no one had heard anything from Ocalan. This was the backdrop to the BDP MPs’ visit. Ocalan was prepared for the visit and had already planned how he was about to initiate the new process.

This is how Ocalan introduced it:

‘This process has been ongoing since the times of Ozal, Erbakan and Ecevit. We have been working on this for 20 years. It has ceased in the past two and a half years. They have been trying to invalidate me for the past 14 years. They are approaching me with the intent of annihilating me; they will continue to do so. There will be some that will want to sabotage this new process (exactly a week after this sentence Sakine Cansiz and her friends were murdered in Paris). After every meeting here we are hearing of guerrillas losing their lives. This is how they are sending their messages. The meetings that we are having with the state officials are important. I will write a letter about the development of our meetings. I will propose a method while preparing my letter. A legislative commission needs to formed in parliament to oversee the withdrawal of the guerrillas. This can be called the Truth Commission or Reconciliation Commission…

…If the guerrillas are to withdraw, then a peace council needs to be formed to avoid violence and abuse against the people.’

Ocalan said these things on of January 3rd, 2013, at about 10am. Ahmet Turk and Ayla Akat Ata were sitting around the table along with the state officials. This meeting and all meetings before and after were voice and video recorded by the state. This means that the state is in possession of the hundreds of meetings that have occurred on the island between Ocalan, the HDP and the state.

In all of these meetings, Ocalan consistently outlined his mission, what both sides had to do in order to pursue a peaceful solution and what legislative steps needed to be taken. He overcame many obstacles and made significant criticisms towards both the government and the PKK. During this time, Ocalan wrote 15 letters to the PKK explaining his approach to the process. On several occasions he made open statements in order to further the process.

During that meeting Ocalan also summarised his expectations of the process:

‘We want to establish the Kurds as a democratic unit. Unless this is constitutionally and legislatively acknowledged peace cannot be established. How are we going to live? How are we to live without a legislative and constitutional acknowledgement of 20 million people? This is why I am drawing up a plan of action.’

This is how Ocalan outlined his plan to both the delegations that were listening and taking notes.

1- The securing of an atmosphere of military inactivity.

2- A legal and constitutional process.

3- A process of normalisation.

Ocalan sent a letter to the Kurdistan Communities’ Union (KCK) administration that detailed these headings. After receiving a reply to his letter from the KCK, Ocalan presented his three-part plan to the state delegation on the 13th of February, 2013. This plan of action was also supposed to be sent to the KCK.
Ocalan’s handwritten letter consisted of 22 pages and was titled ‘The Plan of Action for a Democratic Peace’. The first part consisted of 7 articles, the second part consisted of 5 articles and the third part consisted of 7 articles.

In the first part, after warning both sides of the importance of the language used for the healthy development of the process, Ocalan had this to say:

‘Once both sides have reached agreement over the main principles, a meaningful withdrawal from areas of conflict should be achieved by June, 2013.’

Further down the document Ocalan expressed a fundamental expectation that was never fulfilled by the government.

‘All obstacles behind a withdrawal should be abolished and legal loopholes should be urgently filled.’
In the fourth article of the first part of his plan Ocalan had called for a commission to be formed by the government that would monitor the situation in the regions where the guerrillas would withdraw from; alongside this, Ocalan proposed the establishment of a wise persons group too.
Ocalan had stated that ‘once the atmosphere of military inactivity was achieved’ the second stage would kick in. This part of the process, including legal and constitutional amendments, was to be completed by the Autumn.

This is how Ocalan had expressed his expectations for the second stage:

‘Constitutional steps. Firstly, certain problematic articles need to be negotiated on, primarily the election law and the political parties law, certain fundamental laws need to be democratised and the European Charter of Local Self Government should be signed.’

Ocalan calls for a change to the definition of citizenship and demands that it be rid of ethnic and religious reference and say ‘all identities should be allowed to freely express themselves’.

Ocalan advises that in order for the swift progression of the process there must be contact with academia, the media and civil society. He also says that conferences and workshops would be very useful for the legislative and constitutional side of things.

Ocalan had said that without the completion of the first and second stages the third stage, the stage of normalisation, was not possible. Ocalan had said that international assistance on monitoring these stages could be a good idea.

In the document Ocalan had outlined the third stage in 7 articles. Ocalan wrote ‘the main of this stage is to normalise life by ending the atmosphere of war and constructing a permanent atmosphere of peace. The abandonment of arms is conditional on the ontological solution of the Kurdish question.’
Ocalan had said that the plan that he had drawn up was a draft and that both sides could turn it into a joint document.

The delegation representing the state in the Imrali meetings had accepted Ocalan’s draft plan and made assurances that the necessary steps would be taken. After the KCK had also responded positively to the plan, Ocalan made his historical call for withdrawal on Newroz Day, 2013.

In a press meeting on the 25th of April, 2013, Murat Karayilan declared that the guerrilla forces would start withdrawing from Turkey on the 8th of May. The process would then progress accordingly. Only a few days after the 8th of May when the first guerrilla groups had started to withdraw, the government spokesperson at the time, Bulent Arinc, said that ‘they could go to hell’. Whereas what was expected of the government was for it to take legislative steps and make preparations for the initiation of the second stage as outlined in the draft document.

Selahattin Demirtaş and Pervin Buldan go to the meeting at Imrali Island, Öcalan tells them he is going to assess the past year of the process. A week before this meeting on 9th September, the Kurdistan Communities’ Union (KCK) declared that they had stopped the withdrawal of guerrilla forces because the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government had wasted months and not taken any steps to take the process into its second phase.

When Demirtaş updates Öcalan about this Öcalan’s response is, ‘I know… I will evaluate it.
Abdullah Öcalan says that the process needs to go forward with a different format, and that the situation until that point has been one of dialogue, but that this has been sufficient, he continues:

‘From now on we will call this process the negotiation process. If it happens that is. It is down to the government, I have told them verbally and in written form. If they accept we will begin the negotiation process in October.’

Yes, these words were spoken by Abdullah Öcalan on the island of Imrali almost two years ago on 15th September 2013. And of course Öcalan approves the KCK’s decision regarding withdrawal with the following words:

‘The AKP enjoys putting things off. I thought Qandil would do whatever it could before 1st June (means withdrawing from Turkey). As the leader this is how I saw it. But they also have legitimate grounds. They (the Turkish state) laid traps, built military stations, killed villagers and didn’t pass a law for withdrawal. They even built dams for military purposes. Qandil rightly took precautions.’

At this point in his speech Öcalan turns to the committee representing the (Turkish) state and says:
‘Dear representative, when I said June 1st for withdrawal (of guerrilla forces) I thought a law would passed and guerrillas would withdraw in vehicles, travelling a route that would take a month in 12 hours. Now they are appearing on TV and saying, ‘Öcalan said June 1st but the organisation (KCK) are not listening to him.’ What did you think guerrillas would do, wear wings and withdraw. How are they to withdraw? If the government was clever, the withdrawal would have ended on June 1st.’

In a later meeting, Öcalan was to criticise himself for his call for withdrawal without the necessary law being passed (in parliament); and said that the government had exploited and abused this important step for a solution and missed an opportunity.

A little while after this meeting Selahattin Demirtaş held a press conference disclosing Öcalan’s approach to the process as well as criticising the AKP government’s flippant approach; due to this he was prevented from visiting Öcalan again by an order from then PM Erdoğan.

The action plan Öcalan had prepared and was continually revising following meetings with all the different parties was not being put into practice. The process had not evolved into the negotiation stage and the government was not taking any steps for this to happen. Conversely 189 new military stations had been built just in the Hakkari area and the tender for hundreds of stations in the Amed (Diyarbakir) and Dersim (Tunceli) area had been given to TOKI (Collective Dwelling Administration – bound to the Turkish PM’s Office). Nothing had been done about the situation of ill prisoners, which Öcalan attached a lot of importance to, and even their treatment was being prevented. Steps taken by Öcalan and the PKK for a solution were being deemed as weakness and plans for military and political attacks were underway. People who were resisting against these plans were being attacked and civilians were massacred.

The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) committee who were visiting the KCK and Imrali made their discomfort public and stated that the government was not making plans for a solution but for annihilation. Öcalan was adamant that if the government made the most of the process a Kurdish-Turkish alliance would emerge from the chaos of the Middle East and that this synergy would have an enormously positive impact on the region. However if the process did not develop and a deadlock was insisted upon, a major fracture could occur, Öcalan was telling the HDP and state committee. He was explaining in a detailed way the things that needed to be done for this fracture not to occur and for the war not to intensify.

At the meetings in September and October 2013, Öcalan insisted that ‘the process continue in the new format,’ and said that steps be taken and negotiations begin before Newroz 2014. Seeing that the process would not continue in the way they wanted it the government began sending, apart from the routine state committee, a high ranking political official to Imrali, who gave guarantees that the necessary political and legal steps would be taken for the process to develop.

Attaching import to the initiative taken by the AKP government’s high ranking offical, Abdullah Öcalan expected the negotiation process to begin in the spring months of 2014.
All the details were hashed out and the official upon his return from Imrali emphasised to his government the importance effort shown by Öcalan for peace.

However the process didn’t develop as hoped for.

The AKP government hastened military preparations in North Kurdistan and via organisations like ISIS prepared for the attack on Rojava and especially Kobanê. Their aim was to limit the actions of guerrilla forces’ in North Kurdistan and Turkey, strike a blow to the gains made in Rojava and return to the Imrali table with the upper hand to force concessions.

Thus in July 2014 the first wave of attacks against Kobanê began. These were defeated but on 15th September 2014 (after ISIS captured weapons from Mosul) the more reckless attacks started. Following the strong resistance in Kobanê, the 6-7-8 October uprisings (in North Kurdistan & Turkey) and the actions organised around the world including the 1st November World Kobanê Day, the state began reappraising the situation. It was now clear that the state would not be able to get what they wanted from the process which Öcalan had started for a democratic solution, but which they were using to suppress the Kurdish freedom struggle.

As the war in Kobanê raged on, Turkey’s National Security Council (NSC) made the decision to ‘hasten preparations for war and carry out all-out war’ on 30th October 2014. Thus Öcalan was to ask the HDP committee who went to visit him in November ‘What does Qandil (KCK) think of this?.’ The HDP committee’s response was, ‘The KCK administration think the NSC have decided on all out war, to which Öcalan replied, ‘Is that right? Yes, I think the same too. The NSC has decided on all out war…’

To nullify the state’s all-out war concept and force through, even though there was little hope, a solution, Öcalan developed a new solution plan. During this period he was warning the state that, ‘If you make Kobanê fall I will declare four more cantons in the areas of Botan, Amed and Serhat.’

To accelerate the process Öcalan prepared a draft for negotiations and presented it to all parties in November 2014. The document which consisted of 4 main headings and 66 sub-headings was deemed appropriate by all sides. The 10 articles declared in Dolmabahçe on 28th February were a summary of the 66 headings from this draft.

According to the draft prepared by Öcalan, all articles were to be negotiatied. Negotiations were to end by 15th February. If there was an agreement then practical steps were to be taken.

Öcalan’s proposal was that a commission be formed in parliament in regards to the practical steps needed to be taken. The responsibility of this commission, which would include members from outside parliament, would be to investigate the truth. Öcalan wanted this commission to meet with him in the first place. He wanted to discuss the reasons for why the PKK had taken up arms and the deficiencies and mistakes of both sides during the decades long war. Öcalan was going to state his thoughts and decision regarding an ‘end to the armed struggle’ at this meeting.

If the negotiation process had come to a (positive) conclusion on 15th February and the commission mentioned above had been formed, the PKK were going to convene their congress and declare that the armed struggle against Turkey had come to an end; this was stipulated in Öcalan’s draft for a solution.
The state accepted this draft and continued meetings. A room with a large table in the middle was set up. Öcalan, the (extended) HDP committee and the state committee were to sit around this table. Also the monitoring committee, which was to be formed of individuals agreed upon by all parties, was to be present at the table and witness proceedings.

The first meeting at this table took place on 9th January 2015.

For the first time a meeting was being carried out around the big round table that was placed in the newly built hall in Imrali Prison.
The meeting was attended by Pervin Buldan, Idris Baluken and Sirri Sureyya Onder from the HDP; A delegation led by Muhammet Dervisoglu from the state and Abdullah Ocalan.
The opening remarks were made by Ocalan who began by saying ‘This is a historic meeting. One stage is ending and a new one is beginning. We are undertaking a very meaningful mission. We need to hurry. Mr Dervisoglu, you are a man of the people just like me, I believe that we will solve this problem together.’
Dervisoglu acknowledged Ocalan’s sentiments and the meeting began.

The contents and technical details of the negotiation process were discussed in this meeting. Names of people that would take place in the observatory committee were discussed. While the state delegation was complaining about certain statements made by the KCK, Ocalan replied by saying that the reluctance of the state in taking concrete steps was making things difficult. Ocalan said that even critically ill political prisoners were not being freed and that this could not be used as leverage in the negotiations. At this point the HDP delegation reminded everyone of a speech made by Prime Minister Davutoglu who had said that it was he who intervened and stopped the prisoners from being freed.

In the second meeting that was conducted in the same room with the same people it was agreed that a joint declaration would be issued to the public so that the process could be made more transparent. Once this was agreed upon, work started on a joint declaration. The HDP prepared a declaration and presented it to the state delegation. Later, the state delegation also prepared a document and presented it to the HDP. This document, however, had nothing about the steps that needed to be taken to further the process only how the PKK should disarm. The HDP presented this document to the KCK. The KCK rejected this document. In a TV program, Cemil Bayik replied to this document by saying ‘they should not make fun of us, we are not children’.

The HDP stated that the state’s document did not coincide with what was being talked about around the negotiating table with Ocalan in Imrali island.

Demirtas later claimed that the ‘AKP wants us to deceive Qandil and Ocalan’.

On the 27th of February, 2015, another visit to Imrali materialised in order to overcome the crisis of the joint declaration. And again the same people gathered around the same table. Ocalan read both the state’s and the HDP’s document and discussed with both sides about how it could be turned into a joint declaration. The state and the HDP later agree to make the statement public the next day, 28th February. This joint declaration was read in Dolmabahce Palace.

Let’s listen to Demirtas’ account of what happened after:
“We had also demanded that the joint declaration prepared my Mr Ocalan be read out jointly. When our delegation went there[Dolmabahce Palace] there was a small problem with the seating plan. Upon this, the state delegation called Erdogan. Erdogan intervenes and tells them ‘don’t dwell on small issues like this, make the announcement’.”

So, even though it was Erdogan who intervened and solved even the tiniest little technical issue, he was later to say that he had no idea that the declaration was being made and that he thought it was a bad idea.
Anyway, the historical declaration that was made on the 28th of February made the 10 articles in the agreement public knowledge. However, even after the joint declaration at Dolmabahce, the government chose to manipulate the document and disregard the 10 articles and only concentrated on disarmament.
However, according to the Imrali meetings the process was supposed to progress completely differently.
Ocalan was supposed to be able to form his own delegation for the negotiations. The state delegation was also supposed to change in quality; the delegation was supposed to have some sort of decision making authority.

An observatory delegation was also supposed to be formed in order to mediate over any sticking points in the negotiations between the sides. This observatory delegation as also supposed to monitor the sides to see if they were acting in accordance with the negotiations.

The sides were supposed to negotiate on each of the articles in the document and employ specialist people in helping to formulate specific articles.

Legislative steps were supposed to be taken on articles that were agreed upon. The last of the articles in the joint declaration was constitutional amendments.

However, due to the fact that Turkey was nearing an election no one expected any legislative steps to be taken. The Kurdish movement’s expectations were as follows:

The signing of the declaration by both sides, for certain steps to be taken before the election and for the rest of the process to be undertaken by the new parliament.

If the negotiation period had been successfully capped, a parliamentary commission formed and the meetings with Ocalan continued then the agenda of the proposed congress of the PKK would have been set.
The government had no roadmap to counter the significant steps taken by Ocalan. Rather, they were trying to politically counter Ocalan’s efforts. There was hardly any expectation of a government that still does not accept the Kurds as a people to take any sincere steps. However, Ocalan would always say that ‘we must acclimatise the government for peace’. This is why he insisted on the continuation of the process.
Ocalan outlined his take on the elections and the Newroz letter in a meeting on the 5th of April between him and both the delegations of the state and the HDP. The names of those that should take their place in the observatory committee were looked at again. After the Newroz the state delegation, the HDP delegation and Ocalan were going to meet around the table to officially begin the negotiation process.
However, this meeting was the last meeting with Ocalan.

In any case, the negotiating table was knocked over even before the 5th of April when the government had publicly declared that there was no table, no negotiation and no declaration.