ISIS Terrorists Reveal: We only fear Israel

German reporter Jürgen Todenhöfer, who spent 10 days in 'Islamic State', says: 'They know the Israeli army is too strong for them.'

By Gil Ronen

Israel's military is the only army in the world that ISIS fears, according to the only Western journalist whom the sadistic terror group has allowed into its territory.

Jürgen Todenhöfer, a former member of the German Parliament, spent ten days in ISIS territory in Iraq and Syria, accompanied by his son Frederic, and published a book about his experiences. He returned convinced that the group was “preparing the largest religious cleansing in history” but told Jewish News: “The only country ISIS fears is Israel. They told me they know the Israeli army is too strong for them.”

Todenhofer claimed that ISIS wants the West to send ground soldiers to the region, so that it can capture US and British soldiers. “They think they can defeat US and UK ground troops, who they say they have no experience in city guerrilla or terrorist strategies. But they know the Israelis are very tough as far as fighting against guerrillas and terrorists,” the journalist said.

“They are not scared of the British and the Americans, they are scared of the Israelis and told me the Israeli army is the real danger. 'We can’t defeat them with our current strategy,' [they said]. 'These people [the IDF] can fight a guerrilla war."

The terrorists were much more confident regarding western armies: “In Mosul there are 10,000 fighters living among 1.5 million people in 2,000 apartments, not in one place – so it would be difficult [for western soldiers] to fight them. ISIS fighters are ready to die in a war against western soldiers.”

Todenhofer claimed that ISIS says it accepts Jews and Christians if they pay the Jizya, a special tax – something like 600 dollars per year.

The journalist held Skype conversations for six months as a prelude to his trip. He said: “The only reason why I was allowed to go [was] because I had built up special relations with them. I asked journalists to come with me but nobody was prepared to go there. But I will never go back.”

The report belies the bravado exhibited by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Saturday in an audio recording, in which he said his jihadists are preparing to attack the Jewish state.

"The Jews thought we forgot Palestine and that they had distracted us from it. Not at all, Jews. We did not forget Palestine for a moment. With the help of Allah, we will not forget it."
"You will never find comfort in Palestine, Jews. Palestine will not be your land or your home, but it will be a graveyard for you."

Zero knowledge proof as an enabler for Cyber weapon information sharing

About the Zero knowledge proof and the ability to proof capability to attack or to defence implementing the cyber deterrence.

Successful deterrence based on three aspects – Capability, Threatening message and Transmitting the message to the opponent. Therefore, One of the critical issues in cyber deterrence is the ability to proof your capability to attack or to defence. If you can prove you can do it, the other side will be more convinced, and deterred.
Applying Deterrence by punishment force you to prove to the other side that you can compromise or damage his systems.
Applying Deterrence by denial force you to prove that you can defend your systems from a potential attack.
In both cases, the cost of the attack in the eyes of your opponent is rising. And with rising costs, he will think twice before carrying out one.  However, why should one expose his secretive cyber weapon or defence structure before he has to use them?

Most of the Cyber weapons are disposable. Such are the defence solutions. If you expose your cyber weapon, your opponent will build a defence solution. If you do so with your defence structure, a hacker will find a way to bypass it. But what if there is a way to show your opponent your capabilities without reviling your secrets?

One method that potently could serve this propose is Zero knowledge proof [ZKP]. It’s a way in cryptography to prove to the other side that you hold the secret without exposing it to him.

Altho the Zero knowledge proof is used in cryptography, the abstract idea can play a role in Cyber deterrence to strengthen the capability projection of the player.

Let’s assume I have a cyber weapon that can destroy the opponent electric grid, and I want to use it to prevent him from destroying mine [I assume that he has an unknown, such weapon].
In that scenario, the first step is to convince him that I have such ability. But how can it be done? If I use it, deterrence will fail. If I don’t, it will leave a great deal of uncertainty, and deterrence will fail. It seems as “Catch 22” scenario.

However, if we add to this situation a Zero knowledge proof mechanism that will allow me to convince him that I have the ability without reviling it, deterrence can succeed.

There is no doubt it’s an initial idea. For now, the Zero knowledge proof is used in cryptography and reuse it as a cyber weapon or defence structure proof mechanism requires further research. But it gives hope to the possibility of applying a successful deterrence in the future cyber domain.

Al-Qaeda in Yemen: "Heart&Mind" Out Reach Campaing

"Locals told MEE that Al-Qaeda's Yemen branch have rebranded themselves as more populist"


Three years after they were kicked out of several cities in south Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has come back and overrun two cities in the province of Abyan, local government officials and residents told Middle East Eye. But people who lived through al-Qaeda’s reign of Abyan in 2011 now talk about new “tolerant and friendly” militants.

In Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan province, a government official who spoke on condition of anonymity because of security concerns, said that early this month al-Qaeda militants quietly stormed military camps and police stations in the city without even drawing the attention of students in schools or public servants in their offices.

“Zinjibar is quiet. People are busy with their daily life,” the government officials said.

Many provinces in southern Yemen have been in a state of anarchy since the Saudi-backed forces and local tribesmen drove out the Houthis. Then separatists and Islamists aligned with the Saudi-backed forces failed to fill the vacuum left by Yemeni soldiers who headed north to fight the Houthis. So Al-Qaeda came in and took the place of the former government-run security agencies.

According to the government official, an alliance of convenience emerged between the militants and local fighters when Houthis seized many districts in Abyan. The two armed parties agreed to halt hostilities and collectively fight their common enemy, the Houthis before the Saudi-led coalition kicked them out.

Less radical?

The official said that al-Qaeda militants who are running his city now are less radical and less pushy about enforcing Sharia laws than those who controlled it in 2011.

“They did not raise their flags or execute soldiers. The militants also allowed government officials to operate in the city, schools are open and soldiers are moving freely in the streets of Zinjibar,” he told MEE.
In 2011, as the regime of the country’s former long-serving president Ali Abdullah Saleh was battling nationwide protests that sought to unseat him, al-Qaeda benefited from rifts within the army and seized three main cities in the south, Zinjibar and Jaar in Abyan province and Azzan in Shabwa province.

Nowadays, instead of spending their days chasing intelligence officers or those who play music, al-Qaeda in Zinjibar has embarked on a “hearts and minds” campaign to convince people to embrace their rule. They have arranged social gatherings to inform residents about their movement and why they decided to surface in the city.

Sons of Abyan

To the astonishment of the locals, the militants have even rebranded themselves as the Sons of Abyan.
“They are acting like election campaigns,” the official said.

In Jaar, a current al-Qaeda stronghold in Abyan which the group also held in 2011, the situation is no different from neighbouring Zinjibar. The militants seized Jaar in late October according to Anwar Al Hadhrami, a local journalist who told MEE that the militants are trying as hard as they can to convince people to accept them.

“The situation is normal and quiet. Al-Qaeda did not harass people like what they did in 2011,” Al Hadhrami said.

Four years ago, Al Hadhrami was in Abyan when the militants seized his hometown. He drew comparison between the militants of today and those in 2011.

“In 2011 Al Qaeda stormed military camps, stopped teachers from teaching some subjects, imposed a curfew during prayer times and strictly enforced Sharia law including amputating thieves’ hands, executing murderers, and whipping those who commit minor crimes,” he said.

On Sunday, Al Hadhrami said, the militants are not visible in the streets or in public offices. There is no sign of their presence in the city except their station inside the ruins of a former military site that they made into a base of operations.

“It is difficult to tell for sure whether they are al-Qaeda militants or another group,” Al Hadhrami said.
Despite confirmation, the governor of Abyan, Al Khedher Al Saidi, has strongly denied about the group’s strong presence in his province, talking about his recent visits to the two cities.

“The governor has been based in Aden since 2011. The militants turn a blind eye to his brief forays into Zinjibar,” the official said.

Despite their friendly approach with the public, some residents said that the militants have chased senior leaders of the Popular Committees, a gathering of tribesmen who backed government army troops who drove al-Qaeda out Abyan and Shabwa in 2012.

Abdul Lateif Al Sayed, the leader of the Popular Committees, fled Zinjibar to another district in Lahj Province, after the militants killed his deputy Ali Sayed and dragged his body in the streets of Zinjibar on 2 December according to Mafoud Fara’a, a separatist figure in Abyan.

Since April, al-Qaeda militants have controlled the port city of Mukalla, the capital of Hadramout, one of most economically and politically important cities in Yemen. The militants quietly expanded their influence into adjusting smaller towns like Sheher and Ghayl Bawazer. As in Abyan, the militants rebranded themselves as the Sons of Hadramout.

All are not equal in the Islamic state

Yassin Aktay

The Syrian issue started to draw greater attention from the international community after the terror attacks in France. In addition to this, we can say that Westerners generally have not seen the forest for the trees. It is obvious that the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) will not end or alleviate the Syrian crisis. In this context, it can be said that, as a result of Turkey's various initiatives, even if inadequate for the time being, an international perspective – aimed at the crisis in Syria as a whole – has started to develop.

Following the draft resolution presented to the UN Security Council by France, Russia, too, presented a draft resolution to the UN Security Council regarding the crisis in Syria, yet the draft was rejected by a majority of the council members based on the grounds that it proposed cooperation with the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad.

In addition to this, it seems that international diplomacy aimed ending the civil war in Syria is going to mobilize recognizably in the near term.

Hence, the opinion that the home stretch has been reached in the Syria crisis is spreading. Yet it is still better to remain moderate on this matter and take note that the crisis has turned into an international fault line.
The sides in Syria have now shifted from a proxy war to a direct war. It was not before 2014 that the sides entered the ground in the Syria crisis that turned into a civil war with the escalation of violence, which began in the form of opposition protests against the regime. In other words, direct contact between international or regional powers may now be in question.

When Iran failed to prevent Assad forces from regressing in the past year after interfering in the course of the war in Syria by the hand of Hezbollah, it started to use direct force in Syria. Russia, another party to the Syria crisis, started to carry out direct operations within Syria in the second half of 2015.

Taking all this into account, it become clear that an extremely serious effort is necessary for a likely international solution in Syria. It is not impossible, but it is quite difficult without serious flexibility in the current positions of the sides. Russia is continuing to hit positions in Syria with missiles fired from submarines in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, in news reported based on information from Russian authorities, it is claimed that Russia is using cruise missiles in addition to long-range missiles when hitting these targets. There is no need to focus in length on the theory that there is more to these attacks by Russia from the east Mediterranean than the Syria crisis and ISIL problem.

The most serious question on minds regarding Syria is whether the US and Russia reached an agreement on Syria's future. Russia explaining after US Secretary of State John Kerry's statement that Turkey and the US are going to start cleaning Syria's border, that its intervention in Syria is aimed at protecting the Syrian state, not the Assad regime, and adopting a moderate approach regarding Russia's operations in Syria, strengthens these opinions. However, it could be said that assessing all this within the scope of “smart power” approach that emerged as US President Barack Obama's foreign policy paradigm, would be a more accurate analysis.
The term “smart power” was introduced as a product of “hard power,” which can be roughly defined as military power, and “soft power,” which also can be roughly defined as culture, political value and economic power elements. But the Obama administration applied the term differently than defined by Joseph Nye, who is credited with having coined the term. What Obama defined as “smart power” was already named “Ostrich Diplomacy” by opposition groups.

The vibrations caused by smart power in the US's foreign policy led to a greater radical vibration of players regarding Syria. In other words, it could be argued that the most important cause of significant failures in foreign policy of global and regional powers on Syria and regional policy for the last five years, is the US's lack of a determined attitude in its foreign policy. So, the effect of the vagueness of smart power on US foreign policy regarding intervention in areas of crisis, is felt more clearly and with impact by the other players. The power voids that appeared as a result of this were filled by terrorist organizations such as ISIL and People's Protection Units (YPG).

Everybody's ISIL to their own
When analysis is made in this way, it could be said that ISIL taking the spotlight over the real issue that has weakened US's foreign policy. We had previously mentioned that ISIL has become a medium that provides legitimacy to not only the players in Syria, but also regionally. Such that even Bashar Assad, the bloodthirsty dictator of the Syrian regime, said that he will not leave power before wiping out the ISIL threat from Syria. It seems as though ISIL's multifunctional Swiss army knife-like state has led to the following situation: Similar to Syria, every country actually has its own ISIL. Germany, France, the US, Russia, Iran, the Assad regime and even Israel all have their very own ISILs, because ISIL is a qualified skeleton key that opens all doors.

It could be thought that every player, who points to only ISIL as a threat, without taking the Syrian crisis as a whole, has its own ISIL. The broadness created by ISIL leads to the failure of the US's foreign policy.
It should now be clearly stated with determination that the solution in Syria requires the end of the Assad regime as much as the necessity to fight ISIL, and policies should be centered on this. Any alternative aside from this will simply help push through alone and will not yield any outcomes.

Paris terror attack: The booming black market for fake Syrian passports

..................."Many of the asylum seekers tell journalists and aid workers that they are from Syria, even if they are not, under the assumption that a Syrian shoemaker fleeing bombed-out Aleppo will be welcome, while a computer programmer from Kosovo will not be.

It is common knowledge on the migratory route that some who are not from Syria shred their real passports in Turkey and simply fake it.
 
A couple of reporters, one a native Arabic speaker, who wandered through train stations in Vienna found plenty of newcomers whose accents did not match their stories and whose stories did not make sense."-The Independent

Iran nuclear deal means world may never know extent of its weapons program

WorldTribune


The full extent to which Iran pursued nuclear weapons technology may never be known after the United Nations nuclear agency on Dec. 15 closed its investigation of Teheran’s program.

As part of the nuclear deal between Iran and world powers, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed to formally end the investigation.

A resolution was approved by consensus of the 35-nation board of the IAEA even though director Yukiya Amano told the board his investigation couldn’t “reconstruct all the details of activities conducted by Iran in the past.”

Amano said in November that Iran’s work on “a range of activities relevant” to making nuclear weapons continued until at least 2009.

Iranian IAEA delegate Reza Najafi trotted out Teheran’s usual denial of a nuclear weapons program, saying the Islamic republic’s nuclear activities “have always been for peaceful civilian or conventional military uses.”
Najafi hailed the closure of the IAEA’s investigation as an “historic day” that opens the path to closer cooperation both with the agency and its member nations and boasted that Iran could meet its obligations under that agreement within “two or three weeks.”

Most individual and international sanctions imposed on Iran will be lifted once the IAEA confirms Iran’s compliance.

Critics believe that concerns in the U.S. and among its allies that Iran worked to develop components of a nuclear weapon were overridden by U.S. President Barack Obama’s insistence on implementing the nuclear deal.

U.S. IAEA delegate Henry S. Ensher said the agency could again be called upon to investigate Iran, noting that the closure of the investigation doesn’t prevent following up on “any new concerns regarding weaponization.”

“Nothing has changed,” said Israel’s IAEA delegate, Merav Zafary-Odiz. “All the indicators for the existence of a clandestine nuclear weapons development program in Iran … are still valid.”

ISIL moving inland from Sirte, Libya for ‘access to oil wells’

With an eye on Libya’s oil fields, Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) is fighting to expand its territory beyond its coastal stronghold in Sirte.

French Defense Minister Jean Yves Le Drian said ISIL jihadists have begun to move inland.

“They are in Sirte, their territory extends 250 kilometers [155 miles] along the coast, but they are starting to penetrate the interior and to be tempted by access to oil wells and reserves,” Le Drian told France’s RTL radio.

Libya has the world’s ninth largest (and Africa’s largest) crude oil reserves with 48 billion barrels of proven reserves.

Recent reports said ISIL fighters had launched attacks in the town of Ajdabiyah, east of Sirte. Another report detailed a failed attack in October by ISIL at the Es Sidr oil terminal.

Meanwhile, Libya’s rival governments are expected to sign a UN-backed agreement on Dec. 16 to form a unity government.

Libya descended into chaos after the fall of Col. Moammar Gadhafi in 2011.

Kuwaitis Must Register Their DNA For New Passports

The Ministry of Interior’s Assistant Undersecretary for Citizenship and Passports Major General Mazen Al-Jarrah announced some unusual new requirements for the issuance of Kuwaiti passports: DNA testing.

Speaking about the new Kuwaiti passports, Jarrah said that DNA tests will be a condition to issue them with the aim of building a database with citizens’ DNA information. He explained that issuance of the new passports would start by the beginning of the year, starting with diplomats before offering it to all citizens through service centers, where a special criminal investigation clerk would be present to do the DNA tests for applicants.

“DNA will be a condition to register babies older than six months, be born in or outside Kuwait in order to prevent unlawfully adding anybody to citizenship files,” he explained, noting that he followed up this measure with a ruling family member.

From Sovietology to Jihadology?

Walter Laqueur

sovietologyDavid Engerman is the author of a new study of American Sovietology during the Cold War and its impact on U.S. policy. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs he expresses his belief that the model of Sovietology should guide the study of today’s threats, specifically Jihadism.

It is true that the United States greatly helped the emergence of Sovietology in its early phases by financing research centers, the publication of the Current Digest of the Soviet Press and other useful tools. As a result, Soviet studies did not just serve the immediate interests of government but gained respect by making serious scholarly contributions. Engerman is also right in stressing the importance of studying cultures and not just “threats.” Many of the first generation of Soviet experts were deeply steeped in Russian culture, but such interest and knowledge predated U.S. government educational initiatives. Such wide, often passionate, interest in Russian cultural traditions (think for instance of Alexander Gerschenkorn) could not be taken for granted as far as later-day Soviet experts were concerned.

The subsequent story of American Sovietology was somewhat less inspiring. In the late sixties and the years after, the belief gained ground that the Soviet system was a developmental dictatorship of social justice aimed at making the Soviet people not only more prosperous but also freer. Books appeared claiming that Stalinism had many positive aspects because it had carried out a cultural revolution. Anyway, the purgers and the Gulag had been greatly exaggerated; only relatively few Soviet citizens had suffered or lived in fear.

Altogether, the Soviet system was more democratic and less aggressive than a previous prejudiced generation of Sovietologists had thought. It was a different kind of democracy, and while still somewhat behind the Western living standards, it was gradually catching up. In brief, the West had a great deal to learn from it.

Of course, such views were not shared by all Sovietologists, and it is also true that during this period they had hardly any influence on the shaping of U.S. policy. (But it should not be forgotten that even CIA in these years greatly overrated Soviet economic performance.) In brief, the story of academic Sovietology, with all its achievements, is also a story of pitfalls of every kind and misjudgments. In a recent memoir, I have tried to explain why things in this and other area studies can go wrong.

So Engerman means well, but he underrates the problems arising when the attempt is made to transfer the model of Sovietology to Jihadology (even if we use the less offensive term political Islam). There is bound to be resistance from the very beginning. Is this a legitimate field of study, it will be asked, or a mere construct by Islamophobes? Even if such a field exists, would its study not generate more friction and conflict at a time when sympathy and an effort to understand are needed? Are Westerners at all capable (post-modernists and post-colonialists will argue) to understand cultures and belief systems that are not their own? What would be the point of republishing in translation the material generated by political Islam? It would be only grist on the mills of the Islamophobes, incapable of understanding its real meaning and simply using it for hostile propaganda.

Would not collaboration with the U.S. government fatally compromise the bona fides of Middle Eastern and Islamic studies?

On occasion, Soviet studies—despite an endeavor to be objective and even “scientific”—became emotionally charged. But this cannot even begin to compare with the supercharged climate that has prevailed for some time in the mainstream of Middle Eastern and Islamic studies. What Engerman suggests may still be possible, but those who engage in it should be aware of the enormous resistance they are likely to encounter.

Why Carpet Bombing ISIS Won’t Work

SOFREP\JACK MURPHY

In a campaign speech, Donald Trump talked about his strategy for dealing with ISIS by saying, “I would bomb the shit out of them. I would just bomb those suckers. I would blow up the pipes. I’d bomb the refineries; I would blow up every single inch. There would be nothing left.” While bombing ISIS’s financial centers of gravity is all well and good, bombing the hell out of them is not going to end the conflict in Syria or Iraq. Air power alone does not win wars. This isn’t an opinion, but rather accepted orthodoxy within the military establishment.

What air strikes can do is act as a deterrent, forcing political actors to the negotiation table. In the context of politics, this is possible, but as ISIS is a religious organization as much as a political one, this seems highly unlikely. Al-Baghdadi and his death cult are unlikely to kneel in the face of coalition airstrikes the way Serbian President Slobadan Milosevic did in 1999. Interesting to note, the US government’s plan was to use the Kosovo campaign against Milosevic as a model for ousting Assad from Syria over a year ago. It is safe to say that this plan is now out the window.

In fact, it was probably not the air strikes that forced him to negotiate, but rather the reemergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (probably with some help from the CIA), the lack of Russian support for Serbia, and the threat of a coalition ground invasion. America’s adversaries only consider the threat of air power in the context of it working in tandem with other elements such as ground forces, economic sanctions, diplomacy, and the internal stability of their own state.

These elements work together to coerce America’s enemies into compliance. General Wesley Clark said at the time of the Kosovo campaign that the air strikes were “an effort to coerce, not to seize.” Air strikes degrade enemy capabilities, paving the way for the Infantry seize and hold ground.

In fact, the coalition has already been “bombing the shit” out of ISIS for a total of 8,783 airstrikes as of this writing. However, the Islamic State isn’t much of a state. Much like our bombing of the Taliban in 2001, there are not a whole lot of strategic, or even tactical, centers of gravity to bomb. Blowing up oil infrastructure is a good start, actually even better than bombing high value targets—those individuals can be replaced a lot faster than an oil refinery can. But this will not win the war.

ISIS blends in with the civilian population and takes active measures to prevent being tracked and targeted by signals intelligence (SIGINT). ISIS is also an organization able to quickly transition from conventional warfare to unconventional warfare. They can fight an all-out slugfest on the front lines or they can use terrorist tactics such as suicide bombings inside friendly lines. I saw this personally when I was in Syria; I saw the aftermath of a car bomb detonated near a Kurdish YPG installation well away from the front. If America fights a conventional war against ISIS, the enemy will quickly revert to unconventional tactics.
Haven’t we seen this before? After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it didn’t take long for the Baathists and the Islamists to do the same. The Baathists running ISIS will do the same in 2016 as the coalition and Kurdish elements ramp up the pressure on them.

In order to defeat ISIS, the coalition must use air strikes in conjunction with other tactics and techniques. These would including waging an unconventional war with U.S. Special Forces soldiers advising Kurdish irregular and regular troops, engaging in diplomacy with the Russian and Syrian governments, and cutting off ISIS’s sources of funding and support abroad. This is where the CIA’s paramilitary component could come into play, making sheiks, princes, and other ISIS support in the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia simply disappear into the desert one night.

The slick ISIS propaganda effort to lure the United States into war is working, and terrorist attacks in the West are only increasing the pressure on the United States government to “do something” about ISIS. Unfortunately, much of the public has no interest in thinking this problem set through in its entirety, disregarding their own intellect and replacing it with slogans and glittering generalities that make them feel good. This would include carpet bombing, a strategy that doesn’t work, as evidenced by the strategic bombing of Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam War. Anyone who thinks dropping a nuclear weapon on the Middle East is going to solve America’s problems is a fool, reciting lies obvious to everyone except those who want to believe them.

In the coming year, America is going to be in an extremely dangerous position, not because ISIS is strong, but because we are prone to knee-jerk reactions when we are afraid. Instead of repeating the same mistakes we made in Iraq, Libya, and Vietnam, we need to think carefully about maximizing American power in Syria without committing to a fool’s errand.

ISIS vs Daesh vs ISIL vs Islamic State? For Me Its.....Daesh

Compiled Reports

.....................The four competing names are among a handful of those used by Isis, which emerged in 1999 when it was established by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian militant who allegedly ran a terror training camp and orchestrated bombings and beheadings in Iraq.

His group was initially known as Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, before changing to the simpler al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) after pledging allegiance to Osama bin Laden's network in October 2004. Since then, the group has operated under numerous guises until its current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared it the Islamic State in Iraq (Isi) in 2006, adding the "and al-Sham" to make "Isis" in 2013.

So what do the different names mean?

Islamic State (IS): In June 2014, the militants announced they were dropping the last two letters of their acronym and instead should be referred to as the Islamic State in recognition of their self-declared caliphate.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
 
The original name for the group in Arabic was Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham.
The first three words translate to the Islamic State of Iraq, while "al-Sham" refers to Syria and the wider surrounding area.

The group's stated goal is to restore an Islamic state, or caliphate, in the entire region.
However, the acronym poses an issue for many companies and brands around the world already using the name Isis, often named after the ancient Egyptian goddess of the same name.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
 
The undefined region around Syria is historically referred to as the Levant (an archaic French phrase for the "lands of the rising sun), including modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine and Jordan.

Until Wednesday, this was the main name used by British Government ministers to refer to Isis.
The Obama administration has said it uses the acronym Isil as it believes the word "Levant" to be a more accurate translation from the Arabic name.

Daesh
 
Daesh, sometimes spelled DAIISH or Da'Esh, is short for Dawlat al-Islamiyah f'al-Iraq wa al-Sham.
Many Arabic-speaking media organisations refer to the group as such.

There is an argument it is a pejorative term, deriving from a mixture of rough translations from the individual Arabic words, notably the Arabic verb ???, which means to tread underfoot or crush.

Maajid Nawaz, chairman of the anti-extremist Quilliam foundation, described it as an "ignorant, embarassing and obsessively distracting political trend". He argues Arabic-speakers use the word Daesh because it is "merely the exact Arabic equivalent to the English acronym Isis or the more technically accurate Isil". He adds: "Daesh does not mean anything else in Arabic. It is merely the Arabic acronym for Isil."  (Samuel Osborne) 

Rifts Among Taliban Set To Deepen: Analysts

Rifts among the Taliban after the death of their former leader Mullah Mohammad Omar will not end in the near future, say analysts and sources close to the group, adding that the roots of the differences among the Taliban's divided groups are well entrenched and will remain so for a long time.

It is believed that cracks among the Taliban leadership ranks were apparent in the past but only came to light after the news broke of Mullah Omar's death.

Zabul, Herat and Farah have so far been witness to heavy clashes between the two factions – those who support Mullah Omar's successor Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour and those who support the breakaway faction's leader Mullah Mohammad Rassoul Noorzai.

The recent clashes have resulted in numerous deaths among Taliban fighters.

"You heard recently that the Taliban factions fought in Batikot district [in Nangarhar province]. They [Taliban's divided factions] often fight each other and sometimes Daesh fighters interfere in their infighting," said Ghalib Mujahid, Achin district chief.

Security sources and analysts believe that the infighting among the Taliban factions will occur mostly in southern and western parts of Afghanistan.

"Mullah Mohammad Rassoul has more influence in Herat and his supporters are from Herat, Farah, Nimroz and some of them are from Helmand province. Therefore he will have influence mostly in southern and south-western parts," said Mullah Abdul Bari Fayaz, the head of the High Peace Council Committee in Helmand.
"On the other hand, Mullah Mohammad Mansour has more influence in Helmand because of tribal and regional issues, and his supporters are mostly from Helmand. It is expected that he will have more power in Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan provinces," he added.

However, it is believed that the rifts among the Taliban will extend beyond the borders and it is said that most Taliban fighters live on the other side of the border. One example of this is of recent reports that emerged stating Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour was wounded during clashes recently – across the border.
In addition, Mullah Manan Niazi, a spokesman for one Taliban faction linked to Mullah Rassoul, said recently that Mullah Mansour had been responsible for keeping Mullah Omar's death a secret and said Mullah Omar was killed on the day of the opening of the insurgent group's Qatar office. However, this claim has been rejected by Mullah Mansour.

Analysts meanwhile believe that the rifts will deep if the region's spy agencies interfere in their operations.
"If Mullah Mohammad Rassoul is supported by the region's spy agency(ies) the conflicts (among Taliban) will increase gradually," said Nazar Mohammad Motmaen, analyst in political affairs.
This comes at a time when peace talks are once again on the cards after President Ashraf Ghani announced this week that negotiations will restart in the near future.

The Rise of Private Military Security Companies

MITCHELL MCALISTER

Private military security companies (PMSCs) are by no means a new phenomenon, and the outsourcing of military services is as old as war itself. What is new, however, is the highly privatised way in which war is now being conducted and how the corporate world is being contracted to fulfil what have been traditionally state-dominated tasks. The predecessors to the highly publicised ‘civilian warriors’ of today can trace their heritage to a number of highly volatile and unstable continents spanning the globe throughout the latter half of the 20th century.

The contemporary PMSCs of today have grown into something that the ‘mercenaries’, ‘soldiers of fortune’, ‘wild geese’, or ‘less affreux’ of over half a century ago would never have thought possible. This growth has not been without controversy, and this controversy has appeared at both the tactical and strategic levels and has affected both domestic- and international-level political affairs. This evolutionary process has seen the concept of individuals who embraced mercenarianism as simply a lifestyle choice evolve into the highly professional, highly corporate, and above all else, highly legitimised practice that it is today.

Early concepts of private military security companies
By the very nature of the services they provide, private military security companies ultimately thrive in non-permissive environments where violence and instability are commonplace. The decolonisation period that ensued after the Second World War certainly provided an abundance of such regions, and consequently a stage on which the foundations for the modern PMSC could be set. When tracing these origins, the infrastructure of modern PMSCs are generally attributed to the activity of firms that were contracted to provide military and security-related services throughout a number of continents spanning the globe in the latter half of the 20th century.

Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Americas are littered with examples of military firm activity, with some notable case studies setting the precedent for their effectiveness through widespread utilisation. For instance, Africa, and the war in Angola in particular, could be viewed as one of the benchmarks for PMSCs with firms from around the world lining up to offer their services to assist the Angolan government in their struggle against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). These services included the training of the Angolan armed forces; logistical support; transport, including the maintenance and flying of Angolan aircraft; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tasks; demining; and the protection of critical assets and infrastructure such as the diamond fields and key supply routes.

The two notable firms that fulfilled these contracts were Executive Outcomes (EO) and International Defense and Security (IDAS). EO has long been credited as being one of the most influential PMSCs in regards to its modern counterparts; this firm clearly showed how a private entity with better organisation, training, and equipment, as well as an enhanced readiness to respond to crises anywhere in the globe, could fill critical capability gaps that existed in state-supplied military contingencies.

PMSCs such as EO were well organised and suitably enabled to avoid the complications associated with the ad-hoc multinational forces that inter-government organisations, most notably the United Nations, had become renowned for deploying in order to deal with crises and violence (McIvor, 1998 p.3). The success enjoyed by EO in Angola and later against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone all but confirmed the potential for the highly structured and extremely capable private military firms, which possess the capacity for global reach, at short notice, in order to deliver outcomes that are beyond the means of conventional and multinational military forces.

Contemporary PMSCs were driven not only by this realisation but by a combination of historical circumstances and opportunities that set the conditions for the unprecedented growth of this very lucrative market. The following section will detail the next evolutionary jump that PMSCs took and how this growth has been criticised for encroaching on traditionally state-held responsibilities.

The evolution of private military security companies
The successful performance of PMSCs across a number of different continents were pivotal in establishing a world-wide recognition of their objective-driven solutions as well as their capability to deliver results in a quicker and more cost-effective manner than what governments were able to provide. What these solutions highlighted was an evolutionary departure from the independent mercenaries where, even though these individuals actively sought to participate in conflict for economic gains, their choice of lifestyle, albeit illegal, did not adversely affect or pose serious and direct challenges to the international system and state-dominated responsibilities.

As private military security companies developed their capabilities and increased their scope of operations, they were simultaneously legitimising the lifestyle that the individual mercenaries had lived before them through their highly corporatised emerging structure. This corporatisation-cum-legitimisation can be viewed as one of the evolutionary tipping points that essentially rebranded an activity that had previously been vilified and outlawed under international law. PMSCs have essentially put a corporate face on one of the world’s oldest professions and ultimately catapulted themselves to unprecedented levels of acceptance and utilisation by governments around the world.

The entrepreneurial ambition of those at the helm of PMSCs can only account for so much growth; the market must reflect a need and respond to the product and/or service that they are offering. The end of the Cold War produced favourable conditions for the growth of the private military industry, and the instability present throughout a number of continents accounted for the unprecedented rise of private military services and firms.

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought with it the elimination of conventional and nuclear war between the two superpowers and instead instilled a newfound political confidence in international relations and diplomacy. This confidence contributed to the significant downsizing of military forces around the world, which left a surplus of trained military personnel who found themselves without employment. This fresh supply of out-of-work soldiers provided a rich source of recruitment for PMSCs, who were more than willing to employ and relocate them to other parts of the globe in order to meet their particular firm’s contractual obligations. These obligations would be fulfilled in a similar manner to the way most multinational corporations operate.

PMSCs will respond to tenders, negotiate contracts and objectives, hire people on the basis of skill and suitability, manage projects, maintain cost-effectiveness, and manage the long-term company reputation and profitability. A PMSC’s focus is ultimately corporate in nature, where profits are the driving force behind their operations. These operations are geared toward “quickly and cheaply orchestrating a successful end to a conflict on behalf of their client.” It is this privatisation of the conduct of military-like services that has landed PMSCs in a somewhat antagonistic position.

The reallocation of the provision of military services from public to private and an increase in regional and ethnic conflicts around the globe have been two of the major drivers that have expedited the growth of private military security companies (PMSCs) into the multi-billion dollar industry it is today. This growth has been facilitated by their widespread engagement by governments around the world, whose policy changes have been focused on privatising their responsibilities for the provision of an array of services such as military advice, logistics, training, policing, close personal protection, technological expertise, asset protection, and intelligence functions.

If Executive Outcomes set the precedent for PMSCs in the 20th century, then Blackwater undoubtedly set the conditions for the 21st century. Blackwater pioneered the industry by cost-effectively filling gaps in military capacity and capability. They revealed the extent that PMSCs were able to contribute to a government’s military operations and policy objectives within an international system. Erik Prince, Blackwater’s founder, has often mentioned how the relationship between his company and the U.S. State Department was not only one of mutual benefit, but quickly developed into one of absolute dependency.
For instance, one of Blackwater’s first assignments in Iraq was arguably one of their most dangerous. They were to protect Paul Bremer, the appointed administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) following the 2003 invasion. At the time, there was no military solution that was readily available to achieve this exceptional task, so the U.S. government contracted Blackwater to fulfill this obligation. Blackwater completed this assignment and achieved their overall objective. The subsequent demand placed on Prince’s firm was unrelenting, extremely dangerous, but absolutely integral to the conduct of the U.S. operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. This inter-dependent relationship has created an absolute reliance on private soldiers to accomplish tasks that directly affect the tactical and strategic success of a conflict. This reliance encouraged private military security companies to grow at such a remarkable rate that national and international legislation was, and still is, playing catch-up. This has challenged the traditional functions, roles, and responsibilities of states.

The challenge of private military security companies to traditional state functions
The outsourcing of war is presenting unique challenges to international security and to the traditional understanding of state power. One of the main criticisms that has been leveled at private military service providers is that they are diminishing a state’s power by taking certain functions away from the nation-state and public institutions, and bringing them into an era of neo-classicalism where free markets and private entities attempt to minimise state political and military power. This minimisation of state-supplied military services has effectively broken a core function of the Westphalian paradigm by separating the state from its natural entity of control by way of the legal use of lethal military force.

The distinction between public and private forms of authority is an important one to make, as public security authorities retain legislative authorisation and a jurisdiction that no other actor should possess. Private security, on the other hand, usually operates within a stipulated regulatory framework within this legislative authorisation, not parallel to it or above it. This distinction is important because, unlike other public functions which have seen government involvement significantly reduced, such as trade and finance, removing absolute control of the provision of violence from governments will see the state’s role in the security sphere become deprivileged.

The large-scale employment of PMSCs has also been criticised for lacking the level of accountability that using traditional military forces demands. The extensive use of PMSCs allows governments to effectively relieve themselves of the political liability that comes with sending uniformed soldiers to war. This unaccountability has been labelled by some as ‘anti-democratic’ based on PMSCs exerting power and influence on a stage that has previously been reserved for publicly elected officials and political parties.
Even though PMSCs have supported Western democratic governments in a number of conflicts to augment state- and IGO-initiated responses, PMSCs have on occasion also supported illegitimate governments and rebel forces. Thus, PMSCs are viewed as operating in armed conflict purely on the basis of profit, not out of any moral obligation to international security and peace. This ‘for-profit’ drive has seen PMSCs grow to such size and influence that they are able to significantly impact the outcomes of a given conflict to which they are contracted to provide their services. If violence and war are seen as a “tangled and thorny set of human, legal, political, and economic issues,” then introducing PMSCs into the fold exacerbates these issues to a far greater extent.

The integration of private militaries into the operations of, and outcomes sought by, the most powerful militaries in the world means that they are now a permanent feature of these states’ order of battle (ORBAT). The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have all but cemented the necessity of PMSCs in 21st-century conflict; U.S.-led military operations in both of these wars were the first in history to be dependent upon the services provided by private contractors. PMSCs are gearing up for another structural change in which private military firms distance themselves from the kinetic and offensive functions that have dominated the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, moving instead into a fundamentally more acceptable space. The following article segment in this series will detail how PMSCs are again rebranding themselves, trying to undo the stigmas that more recent wars have brought.

PMSCs have transformed from “historically ubiquitous mercenaries” to highly corporatised firms that have dominated the conduct of every major American military operation in the post-Cold War era, and they appear to be making yet another professional evolution. PMSCs have drawn a considerable amount of criticism in recent times and as such have been labelled by some as a negative phenomenon that has eroded political accountability and democracy, as well as states’ control over violence and other traditionally held responsibilities.

The contracting of PMSCs and other military service providers by different states has also been seen as a deliberate attempt to circumvent the responsibilities to human rights that most are obliged to uphold as signatories to the Geneva Convention. PMSCs, as non-state actors, are not impelled to abide by these regulations, and are criticised for being able to operate outside of these moral boundaries. This was seen on a number of occasions throughout the Iraq War where PMSCs such as Blackwater, Titan Corp., KBR, DynCorp, CACI, and Aegis Defence Services acted at times with impunity and a complete disregard for the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). In the same way that mercenaries of the 20th century earned themselves a complete distrust based on their professional and personal conduct, history appears to have repeated itself with PMSC involvement in events such as the Nisour Square massacre and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.
With their reputation and perceived trustworthiness steadily on the decline, PMSCs have focused their efforts on branding and carefully selecting the types of operations they are conducting in order to reverse the ever-growing public scrutiny. As with any business, corporation, firm, or publicly traded company that operates on a ‘for-profit’ basis, negative public perception can adversely affect their reputation and, ultimately, their profits. PMSCs have reverted to again filling capability gaps, but this time they are applying a humanitarian approach to the services they are providing. Private military firms are forging very close alliances with more traditional humanitarian actors and non-government organisations in order to soften their image and to distance themselves from the damaging reputation that contemporary PMSCs earned during the height of the Iraq War.

PMSCs framing their operations in the most positive light possible and working with NGOs has been seen by some as an attempt to present themselves as the “new humanitarians.” Adding another complex layer to the international security landscape, PMSCs are now combining the military, business, and humanitarian worlds in new and unfamiliar ways, sometimes “presenting themselves according to their clients’ needs, sometimes as force-multipliers…other times as genuine firms that follow a client-focused approach, and occasionally as humanitarians interested in saving the world.”

This tactic is being used extensively by some PMSCs in order to differentiate themselves from the ‘bad-eggs’ and increase their pool of clients, market share, and overall profitability. There is a growing body of research that clearly identifies how a number of PMSCs are appropriating the humanitarian frame through a number of their marketing and advertising applications, from the designs of their websites, their company overviews, services, mission statements, as well as through multiple trade association memberships such as the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC), International Stability Operations Association (ISOA), and the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC).
Despite this attempt by PMSCs to distance themselves from their traditional functions, the shift to adopt a humanitarian identity by engaging in altruistic discourse is still driven by factors that primarily serve the business interests of these firms. As private entities, these interests invariably revolve around the sustainability and profitability of the company. It is always going to be a delicate subject when combat-related services are performed by private companies and driven by money rather than by the moral obligations such as those championed by the international community. Although the humanitarian approach may not be the silver-bullet solution for PMSCs, it certainly is a step in the right direction to consciously apply self-driven regulatory procedures, even if profit is still the underlying driving force.

Contemporary PMSCs have evolved into one of the most powerful non-state actors that currently operate within the international security and political landscapes. This unprecedented influence is the direct result of their extraordinary and unchecked growth since the end of the Cold War, and this growth has generally been attributed to large-scale military reductions, the push to privatise government services, and an increase in regional conflicts around the globe. Military overstretch and operational failure of inter-governmental organisations such as the United Nations created solution gaps that needed additional support to effectively mitigate them.

State- and inter-governmental-supplied force contingents were not able to quell the long-suppressed ethnic and regional rivalries erupting throughout different continents. What emerged were practical and efficient remedies in the form of the private military security company. These firms were contracted to fulfill a variety of roles that had traditionally been the responsibilities of states and IGOs. This has led to some significant issues and challenges to traditional understandings of power. The growth of this industry and the subsequent reliance on their services by even the most powerful countries drove PMSCs to amass so much influence that they are now considered to be threatening the traditional Westphalian paradigms of the state.

One of the main criticisms that has been leveled at PMSCs is that they are eroding the monopoly that states should ostensibly have over the implementation of violence. Unlike finance and trade, two fields in which governments have grown to minimise their involvement, the consequences of privatising war and conflict may not yet be fully realised. This new and unfamiliar dynamic is highlighting the very real dilemma that questions state relevance. The trend toward privatisation of services relevant to the conduct of war may unfortunately set an irreversible precedence. If PMSCs are to distance themselves from criticism, they must minimise their offensive and kinetic focus and reframe their services in a humanitarian and altruistic light.

OFFICIALS FEAR ISIS HAS ABILITY TO PRINT PASSPORT

The report notes that the primary source for the information was rated at “moderate confidence,” the second-highest rating given for source assessments. Testifying before lawmakers Wednesday, FBI Director James Comey first publicly revealed the nation’s top security officials’ very real anxiety over the problem.
“The intelligence community is concerned that they [ISIS] have the ability, the capability to manufacture fraudulent passports, which is a concern in any setting,” Comey said.

Former Department of Homeland Security intelligence official and ABC News consultant John Cohen said, “If ISIS has been able to acquire legitimate passports or machines that create legitimate passports, this would represent a major security risk in the United States.”

Fake Syrian passports have already been discovered in Europe, most notably two used by suicide bombers in the horrific terrorist attack on Paris last month. The two men are believed to have slipped into Europe with a flood of Syrian refugees fleeing the violence in their homeland.

According to the source that provided the passport information to homeland security officials, Syria is awash in fake documents.

“The source further stated that fake Syrian passports are so prevalent in Syria that Syrians do not even view possessing them as illegal,” the report says. “The source stated fake Syrian passports can be obtained in Syria for $200 to $400 and that backdated passport stamps to be placed in the passport cost the same.”
The report included one example in which law enforcement officials said that a Syrian passport discovered in Turkey was printed with a designator number indicating it had been printed in an ISIS-controlled area earlier this year.

Recently international news outlets have reported that their journalists have been able to purchase fake Syrian passports for a few thousand dollars.

The DHS report says it is unclear what state the “blank” passports stolen from Deir ez-Zour were in or if they were completely blank. It also notes that the “whereabouts of the passport machine(s) remain fluid,” since the source said they are portable. As of April, the U.S. Department of Defense marked Deir ez-Zour as a “contested” city on its public map of Syria (PDF), versus ISIS-dominated for Raqqa.

The HSI report’s last page contains a warning: “If ISIS ability to produce passports is not controlled, their operations will continue to increase and expand outside of their operational controlled areas.”

 "The intelligence community is concerned that they have the ability, the capability to manufacture fraudulent passports, which is a concern in any setting," FBI Director James Comey said before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Wednesday.

Ex-Guantanamo detainee now an al Qaeda leader in Yemen | The Long War Journal

Yemenis a glittering Smart Power success story according to our president -- whose fixation with emptying and closing the Guantanamo Bay terrorist detention facility has placed political posturing above national security prudence. Guantanamo detainee released July 2012 now a leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/12/ex-guantanamo-detainee-now-an-al-qaeda-leader-in-yemen.php … @thomasjoscelyn


Ibrahim al Qosi, an ex-Guantanamo detainee, now serves as a leader and spokesman for al Qaeda in Yemen. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released a new video featuring a former Guantanamo...
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released a new video featuring a former Guantanamo detainee, Ibrahim Qosi, who is also known as Sheikh Khubayb al Sudani. In July 2010, Qosi plead guilty to charges of conspiracy and material support for terrorism before a military commission. His plea was part of a deal in which he agreed to cooperate with prosecutors during his remaining time in US custody. Qosi was transferred to his home country of Sudan two years later, in July 2012. Qosi joined AQAP in 2014 and became one of its leaders. Qosi and other AQAP commanders discussed their time waging jihad at length in the video, entitled “Guardians of Sharia.” ... Qosi’s appearance marks the first time he has starred in jihadist propaganda since he left Guantanamo. His personal relationship with Osama bin Laden and time in American detention make him an especially high-profile spokesman.


Qosi was a loyalist and personal associate of Osama Bin Laden, and we cut him loose in 2012 as part of a plea deal.  After his release to his native Sudan, Qosi traveled to Yemen, where he enlisted as a leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Penninsula (AQAP), one of the terrorist group's most active and malignant strains.

A leaked Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) threat assessment and other declassified files portray al Qosi as a devoted follower of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. In the JTF-GTMO threat assessment, dated Nov. 15, 2007, US intelligence analysts deemed him to be a “high” risk to the US and its allies. “Detainee is an admitted veteran jihadist with combat experience beginning in 1990 and it is assessed he would engage in hostilities against US forces, if released,” the memo reads.


He was released and promptly returned to jihad. Recidivism among ex-Gitmo detainees is an ongoing, bipartisan problem.  It was revealed that one of the suspected Benghazi attack ringleaders was once held at the US military facility in Cuba.  He was freed by the Bush administration.  (To this day, only one Benghazi attacker has been taken into American custody; he's being tried as a civilian).  Having been repeatedly thwarted by strong Congressional majorities -- from the Reid/Pelosi era, all the way up through last month -- the Obama administration is reportedly still mulling options to disregard both Congress' will and the law by closing Gitmo down anyway.  The American people have adamantly and consistently opposed Obama's reckless, obsessive "I'm not Bush" legacy project:

In order to grease the skids for this potential last-minute, lame duck gambit, the Obama administration has transferred and released dozens of detainees across the world -- including several men US officials have deemed to be recidivism risks.  This includes the so-called 'Taliban Five,' who were traded for deserter Bowe Bergdahl, an illegal episode in which the Obama administration negotiated with terrorists. 

Former US Defense Secretary Warns Of Potential Nuclear Armageddon

Stephen Lendman

Paul Craig Roberts posted Sputnik News report on Perry’s warning about reckless US policy, heading things toward a possible “nuclear apocalypse.”

Roberts, myself and others warn often about reckless US policymakers risking possible nuclear war with Russia and/or China. Their rage for unchallenged global dominance may kill us all.

Perry agrees in remarks delivered before a defense writers group, warning of a potentially disastrous new nuclear arms race, saying:
“We’re now at the precipice, maybe I should say the brink, of a new nuclear arms race. This arms race will be at least as expensive as the arms race we had during the Cold War, which is a lot of money.”
Washington intends spending $1 trillion over the next 30 years, upgrading its nuclear arsenal along with increasing US-led provocative actions near Russia’s borders – risking direct confrontation, possible nuclear war, irresponsible madness threatening life on earth.

Hostile US relations toward Russia elevates the risk perhaps more than ever before – instead of Obama administration policymakers taking the initiative to defuse tensions Washington irresponsibly created in the first place.

Nuclear war by design or accident is a risk too great to take. Perry said he “probably…would not have” highlighted the threat “10 years ago – but today, we now face the kind of dangers of a nuclear event like we had during the Cold War, an accidental war. I see an imperative to stop this damn nuclear arms race from accelerating again.”

He stopped short of explaining it’s fueled by Washington’s longstanding rage for regime change in Russia, as well as all other independent states – replacing independent governments with pro-Western puppet ones, willing perhaps to risk ending life on earth to achieve its insane objectives.

As long as they’re unchanged, the risk of nuclear armageddon remains huge. Life on earth can be extinguished as easily as ordering ready, aim, fire.

The vast majority of Americans are mindless about threat they face. Their ignorance and indifference make the unthinkable possible.

Freed Hamas prisoners from Schalit deal forming independent terror cells, says report

JP

The operation is being run by senior Hamas official Saleh al-Arouri, who is based in Turkey.

Palestinian prisoners released and deported to Gaza, Turkey, and Qatar as part of the Shalit deal are organizing their own terrorist cells in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, according to a report on Thursday.
The deported prisoners, who are members of Hamas’ military wing, are providing guidance and funds to these cells, Hamas sources told Ynet.

The operation is being run by senior Hamas official Saleh al-Arouri, who is based in Turkey.

The sources said, according to the report, that the Hamas leadership in Gaza is pushing for suicide bomb attacks to be carried out in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, but has not been done as of yet.
The exiled Hamas members also have created their own cells in the West Bank to incite, protest and clash with Israeli security forces. This, because they see the West Bank Hamas leadership as too reserved in their activity since they fear being arrested by Israel or the PA.

The focal points of Hamas activity in the Palestinian territories are Nablus and Hebron, Israeli officials said last month.

As authorities struggle to grapple with the wave of Palestinian acts of violence in recent weeks, Israeli officials are convinced that Hamas will make every effort to execute a large-scale attack by using whatever means are available to its men in the field.

Mahmoud al-Zahar, a senior figure in Hamas' political bureau, told an Islamist-affiliated web site in Gaza in October that he was hopeful the current violence would escalate into "an armed intifada."

"Nostradamus of the Balkans": Will Europe be wiped out?

Will Europe be wiped out? Will Rome become the capital of an Islamic Khalifate? Will the war that began in Syria profoundly alter the World Map?

A blind Bulgarian clairvoyant, who died 20 years ago, predicted this. She said there would be a great Muslim war in 2016. Doomsday soothsayers are now hotly debating her predictions, which had 85 per cent success rate.

Baba Vanga, a blind pensioner, was a clairvoyant and made serveral predictions. Among her predictions are 9/11 twin tower attacks and the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami.

she told about Twin Tower attacks way back in 1989. She said two steel birds will attack the 'American Brethern'. Her followers believe that the Great Muslim War prediction too will come true.
Interestingly, she even predicted that a Black American would rule America, but said he would be the last US president.

Baba Vanga was born in a village called Strumica in an area that was formerly part of the Great Ottoman Empire. She has several followers who deify her. Several politicians and rich and famous sought her opinions during her lifetime. She died in 1996.

Who is Baba Vanga?
 
Baba Vanga was born Vangelia Pandeva Dimitrova and led an ordinary life up until the age of 12, when folklore says she mysteriously lost her eyesight during a massive storm or freak tornado.
According to the story, her family found her several days later, her eyes sealed shut and encrusted with a thick layer of dirt and dust.

She later said she experienced her first vision during the days she was missing, and believed she had been given the ability to heal people and predict the future.

Quickly attracting a cult following, she was visited by Bulgarian tsar Boris III during the Second World War.
She later served as an adviser to the Bulgarian Communist Party leaders, some of whom allegedly exploited her to further their own agendas.

It was alleged she used data gathered by Bulgarian secret services to win the trust of her visitors, which included many foreign and domestic politicians.

The house where she worked was reportedly bugged, and there is some suggestion she may have been manipulated to give suggestions to visiting politicians.

Her most famous predictions
 
Baba Vanga reportedly made hundreds of predictions in her 50-year career, becoming known as the "Nostradamus of the Balkans".

She claimed her abilities had something to do with the presence of invisible creatures she could not explain, which gave her information about people.

Her followers believe she predicted global warming and the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami when she warned: "Cold regions will become warm ... and volcanoes will awaken.

"A huge wave will cover a big coast covered with people and towns, and everything will disappear beneath the water. Everything will melt, just like ice.

She is also said to have predicted the 11 September terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York, reportedly saying: "Horror, horror! The American brethren will fall after being attacked by the steel birds.
"The wolves will be howling in a bush and innocent blood will gush."

However, many of the people who were close to her have claimed she never made some of the prophecies attributed to her on the internet.

Although she is said to have correctly predicted the 44th President of the United States would be African-American, she also stated he would be the "last US President". She also predicted nuclear war between 2010 and 2016, which she said would lead to the abandonment of Europe.

In the future, she predicted aliens would help civilisation live underwater by 2130 and that there would be a war on Mars in 3005.

Shortly before her death in 1996, she said a 10-year-old blind girl living in France would inherit her gift, and promised the world would soon hear about her.

WIKILEAKS ON TWITTER: Turkey Planned SU-24 Downing Six Weeks before the Incident

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan planned to shoot down a Russian warplane engaged in Moscow’s anti-Daesh campaign in Syria six weeks prior to the Su-24 incident, a famous Turkish whistleblower apparently said on Twitter.

Erdogan is worried about the outcome of the upcoming elections and is contemplating bringing down a Russian aircraft, the anonymous Twitter user, who goes by the name of Fuat Avni, posted on October 11.
​Fuat Avni, said that Erdogan was the one to give order to shoot down the Russian bomber over Syria under the false pretext that the aircraft violated Turkish airspace.

According to information WikiLeaks shared on Twitter, Erdogan had been trying to mobilize his voters prior to snap general elections, which were held on November 1, by dramatically escalating tensions with Russia. Interesting fact: The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which was founded by Erdogan, managed to regain parliamentary majority, which it lost five months earlier.

Following AKP’s victory, Erdogan, who as a president has limited powers, has pushed for a new constitution, which would grant the president significantly more powers. However, the AKP still needs 13 more votes to be able to hold a referendum on this issue.

“The November 1 election ushered in four years of stability and confidence. Let’s make this period a time of reforms, prioritizing a new constitution,” Erdogan said on November 10.

A combination picture taken from video shows a war plane crashing in flames in a mountainous area in northern Syria after it was shot down by Turkish fighter jets near the Turkish-Syrian border November 24, 2015

On November 24, a Turkish F-16 shot down a Su-24 bomber involved in Russia’s counterterrorism operation in Syria. Ankara claimed that the aircraft had violated its airspace, although it was shot down over Syrian territory.

Graphic shows the terrifying spread of ISIS across the globe

......................Among the atrocities to be attributed to these groups is the use of child soldiers, suicide bombings, gangland-style warfare, kidnappings and extortion.

Frighteningly, the vast majority of them have pledged their allegiance to ISIS either this year or in 2014, suggesting the group is enjoying a rapid growth of influence.

In total, a staggering 42 international groups are believed to have offered support or pledged affiliation to ISIS and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, according to the Global Terrorism Index, published last month by the Institute for Economics and Peace.

Some, such as Saudi Arabia's Supporters of the Islamic State in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, may be little more than rag-tag groupings of people inspired by the ISIS banner.

But others, such as Nigeria's Boko Haram or the Philippines' Abu Sayyaf, have been operating independently for many years and are among multiple well-established groups to swear loyalty to the organization....................

The Anatomy of the Kurdish-Turkish Solution Process

22 August, 2015
By Amed Dicle

The original title of this title ‘The anatomy of a process; who knocked over the Imrali table. It was originally published on ANF in Turkish.

The visit of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) MPs Ahmet Turk and Ayla Akat Ata to the island of Imrali on the 3rd of January in 2013 took the previously initiated meetings between Abdullah Ocalan and state officials to a new level.
Since the 27th of July, 2011, no one had heard anything from Ocalan. This was the backdrop to the BDP MPs’ visit. Ocalan was prepared for the visit and had already planned how he was about to initiate the new process.

This is how Ocalan introduced it:

‘This process has been ongoing since the times of Ozal, Erbakan and Ecevit. We have been working on this for 20 years. It has ceased in the past two and a half years. They have been trying to invalidate me for the past 14 years. They are approaching me with the intent of annihilating me; they will continue to do so. There will be some that will want to sabotage this new process (exactly a week after this sentence Sakine Cansiz and her friends were murdered in Paris). After every meeting here we are hearing of guerrillas losing their lives. This is how they are sending their messages. The meetings that we are having with the state officials are important. I will write a letter about the development of our meetings. I will propose a method while preparing my letter. A legislative commission needs to formed in parliament to oversee the withdrawal of the guerrillas. This can be called the Truth Commission or Reconciliation Commission…

…If the guerrillas are to withdraw, then a peace council needs to be formed to avoid violence and abuse against the people.’

Ocalan said these things on of January 3rd, 2013, at about 10am. Ahmet Turk and Ayla Akat Ata were sitting around the table along with the state officials. This meeting and all meetings before and after were voice and video recorded by the state. This means that the state is in possession of the hundreds of meetings that have occurred on the island between Ocalan, the HDP and the state.

In all of these meetings, Ocalan consistently outlined his mission, what both sides had to do in order to pursue a peaceful solution and what legislative steps needed to be taken. He overcame many obstacles and made significant criticisms towards both the government and the PKK. During this time, Ocalan wrote 15 letters to the PKK explaining his approach to the process. On several occasions he made open statements in order to further the process.

During that meeting Ocalan also summarised his expectations of the process:

‘We want to establish the Kurds as a democratic unit. Unless this is constitutionally and legislatively acknowledged peace cannot be established. How are we going to live? How are we to live without a legislative and constitutional acknowledgement of 20 million people? This is why I am drawing up a plan of action.’

This is how Ocalan outlined his plan to both the delegations that were listening and taking notes.

1- The securing of an atmosphere of military inactivity.

2- A legal and constitutional process.

3- A process of normalisation.

Ocalan sent a letter to the Kurdistan Communities’ Union (KCK) administration that detailed these headings. After receiving a reply to his letter from the KCK, Ocalan presented his three-part plan to the state delegation on the 13th of February, 2013. This plan of action was also supposed to be sent to the KCK.
Ocalan’s handwritten letter consisted of 22 pages and was titled ‘The Plan of Action for a Democratic Peace’. The first part consisted of 7 articles, the second part consisted of 5 articles and the third part consisted of 7 articles.

In the first part, after warning both sides of the importance of the language used for the healthy development of the process, Ocalan had this to say:

‘Once both sides have reached agreement over the main principles, a meaningful withdrawal from areas of conflict should be achieved by June, 2013.’

Further down the document Ocalan expressed a fundamental expectation that was never fulfilled by the government.

‘All obstacles behind a withdrawal should be abolished and legal loopholes should be urgently filled.’
In the fourth article of the first part of his plan Ocalan had called for a commission to be formed by the government that would monitor the situation in the regions where the guerrillas would withdraw from; alongside this, Ocalan proposed the establishment of a wise persons group too.
Ocalan had stated that ‘once the atmosphere of military inactivity was achieved’ the second stage would kick in. This part of the process, including legal and constitutional amendments, was to be completed by the Autumn.

This is how Ocalan had expressed his expectations for the second stage:

‘Constitutional steps. Firstly, certain problematic articles need to be negotiated on, primarily the election law and the political parties law, certain fundamental laws need to be democratised and the European Charter of Local Self Government should be signed.’

Ocalan calls for a change to the definition of citizenship and demands that it be rid of ethnic and religious reference and say ‘all identities should be allowed to freely express themselves’.

Ocalan advises that in order for the swift progression of the process there must be contact with academia, the media and civil society. He also says that conferences and workshops would be very useful for the legislative and constitutional side of things.

Ocalan had said that without the completion of the first and second stages the third stage, the stage of normalisation, was not possible. Ocalan had said that international assistance on monitoring these stages could be a good idea.

In the document Ocalan had outlined the third stage in 7 articles. Ocalan wrote ‘the main of this stage is to normalise life by ending the atmosphere of war and constructing a permanent atmosphere of peace. The abandonment of arms is conditional on the ontological solution of the Kurdish question.’
Ocalan had said that the plan that he had drawn up was a draft and that both sides could turn it into a joint document.

The delegation representing the state in the Imrali meetings had accepted Ocalan’s draft plan and made assurances that the necessary steps would be taken. After the KCK had also responded positively to the plan, Ocalan made his historical call for withdrawal on Newroz Day, 2013.

In a press meeting on the 25th of April, 2013, Murat Karayilan declared that the guerrilla forces would start withdrawing from Turkey on the 8th of May. The process would then progress accordingly. Only a few days after the 8th of May when the first guerrilla groups had started to withdraw, the government spokesperson at the time, Bulent Arinc, said that ‘they could go to hell’. Whereas what was expected of the government was for it to take legislative steps and make preparations for the initiation of the second stage as outlined in the draft document.

Selahattin Demirtaş and Pervin Buldan go to the meeting at Imrali Island, Öcalan tells them he is going to assess the past year of the process. A week before this meeting on 9th September, the Kurdistan Communities’ Union (KCK) declared that they had stopped the withdrawal of guerrilla forces because the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government had wasted months and not taken any steps to take the process into its second phase.

When Demirtaş updates Öcalan about this Öcalan’s response is, ‘I know… I will evaluate it.
Abdullah Öcalan says that the process needs to go forward with a different format, and that the situation until that point has been one of dialogue, but that this has been sufficient, he continues:

‘From now on we will call this process the negotiation process. If it happens that is. It is down to the government, I have told them verbally and in written form. If they accept we will begin the negotiation process in October.’

Yes, these words were spoken by Abdullah Öcalan on the island of Imrali almost two years ago on 15th September 2013. And of course Öcalan approves the KCK’s decision regarding withdrawal with the following words:

‘The AKP enjoys putting things off. I thought Qandil would do whatever it could before 1st June (means withdrawing from Turkey). As the leader this is how I saw it. But they also have legitimate grounds. They (the Turkish state) laid traps, built military stations, killed villagers and didn’t pass a law for withdrawal. They even built dams for military purposes. Qandil rightly took precautions.’

At this point in his speech Öcalan turns to the committee representing the (Turkish) state and says:
‘Dear representative, when I said June 1st for withdrawal (of guerrilla forces) I thought a law would passed and guerrillas would withdraw in vehicles, travelling a route that would take a month in 12 hours. Now they are appearing on TV and saying, ‘Öcalan said June 1st but the organisation (KCK) are not listening to him.’ What did you think guerrillas would do, wear wings and withdraw. How are they to withdraw? If the government was clever, the withdrawal would have ended on June 1st.’

In a later meeting, Öcalan was to criticise himself for his call for withdrawal without the necessary law being passed (in parliament); and said that the government had exploited and abused this important step for a solution and missed an opportunity.

A little while after this meeting Selahattin Demirtaş held a press conference disclosing Öcalan’s approach to the process as well as criticising the AKP government’s flippant approach; due to this he was prevented from visiting Öcalan again by an order from then PM Erdoğan.

The action plan Öcalan had prepared and was continually revising following meetings with all the different parties was not being put into practice. The process had not evolved into the negotiation stage and the government was not taking any steps for this to happen. Conversely 189 new military stations had been built just in the Hakkari area and the tender for hundreds of stations in the Amed (Diyarbakir) and Dersim (Tunceli) area had been given to TOKI (Collective Dwelling Administration – bound to the Turkish PM’s Office). Nothing had been done about the situation of ill prisoners, which Öcalan attached a lot of importance to, and even their treatment was being prevented. Steps taken by Öcalan and the PKK for a solution were being deemed as weakness and plans for military and political attacks were underway. People who were resisting against these plans were being attacked and civilians were massacred.

The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) committee who were visiting the KCK and Imrali made their discomfort public and stated that the government was not making plans for a solution but for annihilation. Öcalan was adamant that if the government made the most of the process a Kurdish-Turkish alliance would emerge from the chaos of the Middle East and that this synergy would have an enormously positive impact on the region. However if the process did not develop and a deadlock was insisted upon, a major fracture could occur, Öcalan was telling the HDP and state committee. He was explaining in a detailed way the things that needed to be done for this fracture not to occur and for the war not to intensify.

At the meetings in September and October 2013, Öcalan insisted that ‘the process continue in the new format,’ and said that steps be taken and negotiations begin before Newroz 2014. Seeing that the process would not continue in the way they wanted it the government began sending, apart from the routine state committee, a high ranking political official to Imrali, who gave guarantees that the necessary political and legal steps would be taken for the process to develop.

Attaching import to the initiative taken by the AKP government’s high ranking offical, Abdullah Öcalan expected the negotiation process to begin in the spring months of 2014.
All the details were hashed out and the official upon his return from Imrali emphasised to his government the importance effort shown by Öcalan for peace.

However the process didn’t develop as hoped for.

The AKP government hastened military preparations in North Kurdistan and via organisations like ISIS prepared for the attack on Rojava and especially Kobanê. Their aim was to limit the actions of guerrilla forces’ in North Kurdistan and Turkey, strike a blow to the gains made in Rojava and return to the Imrali table with the upper hand to force concessions.

Thus in July 2014 the first wave of attacks against Kobanê began. These were defeated but on 15th September 2014 (after ISIS captured weapons from Mosul) the more reckless attacks started. Following the strong resistance in Kobanê, the 6-7-8 October uprisings (in North Kurdistan & Turkey) and the actions organised around the world including the 1st November World Kobanê Day, the state began reappraising the situation. It was now clear that the state would not be able to get what they wanted from the process which Öcalan had started for a democratic solution, but which they were using to suppress the Kurdish freedom struggle.

As the war in Kobanê raged on, Turkey’s National Security Council (NSC) made the decision to ‘hasten preparations for war and carry out all-out war’ on 30th October 2014. Thus Öcalan was to ask the HDP committee who went to visit him in November ‘What does Qandil (KCK) think of this?.’ The HDP committee’s response was, ‘The KCK administration think the NSC have decided on all out war, to which Öcalan replied, ‘Is that right? Yes, I think the same too. The NSC has decided on all out war…’

To nullify the state’s all-out war concept and force through, even though there was little hope, a solution, Öcalan developed a new solution plan. During this period he was warning the state that, ‘If you make Kobanê fall I will declare four more cantons in the areas of Botan, Amed and Serhat.’

To accelerate the process Öcalan prepared a draft for negotiations and presented it to all parties in November 2014. The document which consisted of 4 main headings and 66 sub-headings was deemed appropriate by all sides. The 10 articles declared in Dolmabahçe on 28th February were a summary of the 66 headings from this draft.

According to the draft prepared by Öcalan, all articles were to be negotiatied. Negotiations were to end by 15th February. If there was an agreement then practical steps were to be taken.

Öcalan’s proposal was that a commission be formed in parliament in regards to the practical steps needed to be taken. The responsibility of this commission, which would include members from outside parliament, would be to investigate the truth. Öcalan wanted this commission to meet with him in the first place. He wanted to discuss the reasons for why the PKK had taken up arms and the deficiencies and mistakes of both sides during the decades long war. Öcalan was going to state his thoughts and decision regarding an ‘end to the armed struggle’ at this meeting.

If the negotiation process had come to a (positive) conclusion on 15th February and the commission mentioned above had been formed, the PKK were going to convene their congress and declare that the armed struggle against Turkey had come to an end; this was stipulated in Öcalan’s draft for a solution.
The state accepted this draft and continued meetings. A room with a large table in the middle was set up. Öcalan, the (extended) HDP committee and the state committee were to sit around this table. Also the monitoring committee, which was to be formed of individuals agreed upon by all parties, was to be present at the table and witness proceedings.

The first meeting at this table took place on 9th January 2015.

For the first time a meeting was being carried out around the big round table that was placed in the newly built hall in Imrali Prison.
The meeting was attended by Pervin Buldan, Idris Baluken and Sirri Sureyya Onder from the HDP; A delegation led by Muhammet Dervisoglu from the state and Abdullah Ocalan.
The opening remarks were made by Ocalan who began by saying ‘This is a historic meeting. One stage is ending and a new one is beginning. We are undertaking a very meaningful mission. We need to hurry. Mr Dervisoglu, you are a man of the people just like me, I believe that we will solve this problem together.’
Dervisoglu acknowledged Ocalan’s sentiments and the meeting began.

The contents and technical details of the negotiation process were discussed in this meeting. Names of people that would take place in the observatory committee were discussed. While the state delegation was complaining about certain statements made by the KCK, Ocalan replied by saying that the reluctance of the state in taking concrete steps was making things difficult. Ocalan said that even critically ill political prisoners were not being freed and that this could not be used as leverage in the negotiations. At this point the HDP delegation reminded everyone of a speech made by Prime Minister Davutoglu who had said that it was he who intervened and stopped the prisoners from being freed.

In the second meeting that was conducted in the same room with the same people it was agreed that a joint declaration would be issued to the public so that the process could be made more transparent. Once this was agreed upon, work started on a joint declaration. The HDP prepared a declaration and presented it to the state delegation. Later, the state delegation also prepared a document and presented it to the HDP. This document, however, had nothing about the steps that needed to be taken to further the process only how the PKK should disarm. The HDP presented this document to the KCK. The KCK rejected this document. In a TV program, Cemil Bayik replied to this document by saying ‘they should not make fun of us, we are not children’.

The HDP stated that the state’s document did not coincide with what was being talked about around the negotiating table with Ocalan in Imrali island.

Demirtas later claimed that the ‘AKP wants us to deceive Qandil and Ocalan’.

On the 27th of February, 2015, another visit to Imrali materialised in order to overcome the crisis of the joint declaration. And again the same people gathered around the same table. Ocalan read both the state’s and the HDP’s document and discussed with both sides about how it could be turned into a joint declaration. The state and the HDP later agree to make the statement public the next day, 28th February. This joint declaration was read in Dolmabahce Palace.

Let’s listen to Demirtas’ account of what happened after:
“We had also demanded that the joint declaration prepared my Mr Ocalan be read out jointly. When our delegation went there[Dolmabahce Palace] there was a small problem with the seating plan. Upon this, the state delegation called Erdogan. Erdogan intervenes and tells them ‘don’t dwell on small issues like this, make the announcement’.”

So, even though it was Erdogan who intervened and solved even the tiniest little technical issue, he was later to say that he had no idea that the declaration was being made and that he thought it was a bad idea.
Anyway, the historical declaration that was made on the 28th of February made the 10 articles in the agreement public knowledge. However, even after the joint declaration at Dolmabahce, the government chose to manipulate the document and disregard the 10 articles and only concentrated on disarmament.
However, according to the Imrali meetings the process was supposed to progress completely differently.
Ocalan was supposed to be able to form his own delegation for the negotiations. The state delegation was also supposed to change in quality; the delegation was supposed to have some sort of decision making authority.

An observatory delegation was also supposed to be formed in order to mediate over any sticking points in the negotiations between the sides. This observatory delegation as also supposed to monitor the sides to see if they were acting in accordance with the negotiations.

The sides were supposed to negotiate on each of the articles in the document and employ specialist people in helping to formulate specific articles.

Legislative steps were supposed to be taken on articles that were agreed upon. The last of the articles in the joint declaration was constitutional amendments.

However, due to the fact that Turkey was nearing an election no one expected any legislative steps to be taken. The Kurdish movement’s expectations were as follows:

The signing of the declaration by both sides, for certain steps to be taken before the election and for the rest of the process to be undertaken by the new parliament.

If the negotiation period had been successfully capped, a parliamentary commission formed and the meetings with Ocalan continued then the agenda of the proposed congress of the PKK would have been set.
The government had no roadmap to counter the significant steps taken by Ocalan. Rather, they were trying to politically counter Ocalan’s efforts. There was hardly any expectation of a government that still does not accept the Kurds as a people to take any sincere steps. However, Ocalan would always say that ‘we must acclimatise the government for peace’. This is why he insisted on the continuation of the process.
Ocalan outlined his take on the elections and the Newroz letter in a meeting on the 5th of April between him and both the delegations of the state and the HDP. The names of those that should take their place in the observatory committee were looked at again. After the Newroz the state delegation, the HDP delegation and Ocalan were going to meet around the table to officially begin the negotiation process.
However, this meeting was the last meeting with Ocalan.

In any case, the negotiating table was knocked over even before the 5th of April when the government had publicly declared that there was no table, no negotiation and no declaration.