The Problem With Losing Palmyra

(Stratfor)

Syria

In yet another defeat for the Islamic State, loyalist forces captured Palmyra over the weekend after a monthslong offensive operation. Following other recent defeats by Syrian Democratic Forces in northern Syria and by Iraqi security forces in Iraq, the loss shows just how much the Islamic State's strategic position has deteriorated, even as it remains a dangerous and powerful group.

The loyalists' recapture of Palmyra is a significant victory for Damascus for a number of reasons. Palmyra's historical significance draws considerable international media attention, magnifying the importance of its recapture. On a tactical level, the operation greatly reduced the Islamic State's ability to threaten key government supply lines, especially along the M5 highway and the road to Aleppo. Furthermore, Palmyra's strategic location at an important crossroads will enable the Syrian government to pursue further offensive operations eastward deep into Islamic State territory. In particular, the loyalist forces can be expected to push hard to relieve the besieged 104th Republican Brigade at Deir el-Zour.

The loyalist victory was not an easy one, however, and it highlights Damascus' continued reliance on external support. As part of the operation, the Syrian Army assembled a number of its more elite units, including the Tiger Forces and Desert Hawks. Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps directed foreign Shiite militias, including Iraqi, Afghan and Pakistani units, to aid Syrian forces. Finally, the Russians provided close air support with attack aircraft and helicopter gunships, as well as support from special operations forces deployed alongside loyalist forces. Even with overwhelming air, artillery, armor and numerical superiority, the loyalist forces suffered considerable casualties against a determined Islamic State defense at Palmyra, losing dozens in ambushes.

Despite continual cease-fire violations, the effort has a clear impact on the Syrian conflict. With major offensive operations largely halted on a number of fronts between the rebels and the government, both Damascus and the rebellion have finally shifted the bulk of their attention toward pushing back the Islamic State, which is not party to the cease-fire. This is evident in the Palmyra operation but can also be seen in Daraa in southern Syria, where the rebels have been able to pull a number of their forces from the frontline with loyalist forces to face a growing threat from the Islamic State-affiliated Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade and the allied Harakat al-Muthanna group. The Islamic State has taken note, accusing loyalist and rebel forces of having colluded in an unholy alliance against it. Though this is objectively not the case, the Islamic State is right to fear the cease-fire effort. As long as the lull in fighting between the rebels and the government persists, the Islamic State will continue to suffer from their redirected efforts.