The rise of Iran in the Middle East: between fiction and reality

The dangers of the rise of radical Sunni Islam
Iran is home to the largest Shia population in the world, but it is also home to a substantial Sunni minority. Although not a very large group nationwide — constituting between 8 to 15 percent of the population — the Sunnis are geographically concentrated in the margins of the old empire, where they are very numerous (West Azerbaijan province, the Kurdish-populated areas of Iran, Khuzestan province and the bank of the Persian Gulf, Baluchistan). Moreover, they belong mainly to non-Persian ethnic groups (Turkmens, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis). This localization on the borders and the cross-border character of the ethnic groups to which they belong constitute vulnerability for Tehran. This vulnerability is accentuated by Tehran’s policy toward the Sunni religious minority. Unlike non-Muslim religious minorities (Christians, Jews or Zoroastrians) who are numerically fewer, the Sunnis have no special status. In fact, given the very strong Shia character of state structures, they are more marginalized and discriminated against than they were during the time of the shah. The sporadic tensions between the central authorities and Sunnis have increased since the beginning of the 2000s. Thus, Tehran is faced with armed Sunni groups like Jundallah in Sistan and Baluchistan province — the leader of which was executed in 2010 — or more recently Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice), which appeared in 2012. The latter condemns Tehran’s support for Damascus and claimed a series of attacks in border districts with Pakistan between 2013 and 2015. It is also responsible for the kidnapping of Iranian border guards in February 2015.

In addition to these domestic groups, Tehran — already targeted by Sunni radicals in Lebanon and Yemen — now has to deal with the rise of new hostile forces in its neighborhood. This is the case to the west of the country, with Islamic State installed in Iraq and Syria, and to the east in Afghanistan with the Taliban, which has always been anti-Shia and has been regaining power since the Western withdrawal. Tehran was surprised by the rapid advance of Islamic State. To prevent intrusions on its territory, it strengthened — first discreetly then more overtly — its involvement in Iraq and Syria. Politically, in order to try to reduce support for Islamic State, it pragmatically facilitated the replacement of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki to open the way for a new Iraqi government more supportive of Sunnis and Kurds. To reinforce its image, it also presented itself as the protector of religious minorities, especially of Iraqi Christians threatened by Islamic State.

Militarily, it provided aid in terms of materials, logistics and information as well as advisers to groups considered to be counterweights to Islamic State (Shiite militias, Kurdish fighters and the Iraqi national army) and dispatched Gen. Soleimani and al-Quds forces to advise and assist Baghdad in the fight against this movement. Its action in Iraq gained greater visibility with direct air raids targeting Islamic State at the end of 2014 and the retaking of Tikrit, mostly by Shiite militias, in March 2015. Allied Shia groups were also in the forefront during the spring offensive in 2015 in Anbar province. Tehran publicizes its action in Iraq by distributing propaganda presenting Iran as the only real opponent to Islamic State in the country, with the West being accused of doing nothing.

In Syria, its action has been less publicized. Tehran has continued to assist the Syrian regime by providing it with massive military and financial support, and organizing the transfer of Shiite fighters from Iraq to Syria in order to increase Assad’s resistance capacity. This has also enabled Tehran to consolidate its role as an essential ally for the Syrian regime. However, in Syria, the “fight” against Islamic State is more ambiguous than in Iraq.

Damascus gives priority to focusing its military operations on other more moderate rebel groups rather than Islamic State — although it does also fight Islamic State — in order to present itself as the only possible alternative to the Islamist caliphate. The regime’s survival strategy corresponds to Iran’s objectives in this country. With the successes of Islamic State in spring of 2015 in Syria, Tehran seems to be acting defensively by strengthening coordination between Baghdad and Damascus. A trilateral meeting (Iran-Iraq-Syria) to improve the “anti-terrorist” fight (officially against Islamic State) was organized in Baghdad. Through its actions, Tehran has strengthened its image, presence and influence among its neighbors but it has also become more exposed and has been designated, alongside the US, the main enemy of Islamic State.

In Afghanistan, most of the Taliban do not recognize Islamic State’s leadership, but some Taliban fighters have recently pledged their allegiance to it. In January 2015, a spokesman of the movement announced its “expansion” to “Khorasan” — a geographical area covering the northeast of the Iranian plateau, Afghanistan, Pakistan and also southern Central Asia, an area from which Islamic State has managed to recruit fighters. A former commander of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan was appointed “governor” of the “province,” and in April 2015 Islamic State claimed a suicide attack in Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan. Its supporters have gained ground in Nangarhar in particular.

Even if this country does not appear as favorable as the Middle East for the growth of the movement — the Taliban considers Islamic State a competitor and has warned it to stay out of Afghanistan — the fact remains that these developments are worrisome for Tehran. The worst-case scenario would be the establishment of coordination or cooperation between Islamic State and the Taliban, or among some of their components. It would place Iran in the delicate position of fighting on several fronts. Such an agreement could also use the discontentment of the Iranian Sunni minority to find representatives in Iran. To avoid this scenario, Tehran seeks to extend the discreet contacts it made with the Taliban in the 2000s and find common ground with them to fight against the progression of Islamic State in Afghanistan.