By Jack Caravelli
The 2014 annexation of Crimea and the ongoing civil war in Syria, while major political crises, also are replete with insights about the current state of the Russian military.
First, the Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s disdain for Barack Obama is palpable. If the Russian president continues to judge that Obama has no stomach for the fight, it is not implausible that Russia might challenge the West again elsewhere, possibly in the Baltic.
Conducting military operations on a third front would be a major challenge for Russian forces. Nonetheless, it also could trigger a new crisis as consequential as events in Syria, bringing a possible direct clash between NATO and Russian forces.
At a time when both the United States and its most powerful NATO ally, Great Britain, are suffering severe budgetary declines and diminished capabilities while saddled with timid political leadership, the Russian military is riding the crest of a wave changing the political dynamics in areas critical to U.S. national security.
Four lessons about the current state of the Russian military can be gleaned from its recent performance in Ukraine and Syria.
1) The conflicts illustrate that Russian President Vladimir Putin views his military as an instrument of state power.
War is both an extension and consequence of politics. Putin understands this.
Largely unsaddled by and often disdainful of domestic public opinion, the Russian president has moved aggressively to advance Russian interests in Ukraine and Syria by unleashing his military in both conflicts.
Putin realizes that political goals often are best advanced when backed by military prowess. The Russian military has been called to serve as an instrument of state power.
In contrast, and with the exception of a small deployment of fighter aircraft to Turkey, U.S. President Barack Obama has largely sidelined the U.S. military during both crises, deciding in the words of Mideast expert Dennis Ross, that “he (Obama) was not going to get involved in someone else’s civil war.”
2) The Russian military has reversed a decades-long decline.
Beginning with the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union and extending about twenty years, the Russian military suffered sharp declines in funding, morale and overall military capability.
Putin vowed in several political campaigns, including the 2012 presidential election, to restore the military — long revered in Russia — and has carried out that promise with expanded funding and strong political support.
Those investments are paying dividends. In Ukraine, Russian military forces and those supported by them — the so-called “little green men” — conducted military operations with precision, used advanced small arms equipment, and demonstrated improved command, control and communications, a problem that plagued their August 2008 operations against Georgia.
Nonetheless, the decline has not been fully reversed. Russian aircraft conducting front line operations include fighters that are at least 25 years old although they are still potent in the face of very little opposition from air or ground.
At the same time, Russia also is deploying a new generation of fighter aircraft, the SU-34 Fullback fighter bomber.
3) The military fights as it practices.
The Soviet and now Russian military has a long tradition of carrying out numerous peacetime military exercises which serve as a proving ground for the strategies and tactics it is likely to use in wartime.
Advanced militaries around the globe carry out similar training but senior Russian military commanders probably devote more time and attention to training than any other military force.
Russian commanders also are students of warfare and closely watch how other militaries operate and perform. A large body of military writings, for example, analyzed how the U.S. military operated during the 1991 Desert Storm campaign in the Middle East and used combined arms combat such as mixing ground and air capabilities against enemy forces.
In Syria, Russia has shown a capability to carry out combined arms combat, using Syrian-based fighters aircraft as well as cruise missiles from four naval warships in the Caspian Sea to strike Syrian targets.
4) Russian commanders will learn the lessons from Ukraine and Syria but their political masters may come to dangerous conclusions.
Russian commanders doubtless are monitoring the performance of the men and equipment they have deployed to Ukraine and Syria.
These “real world” lessons will aid in improving future performance. More worrying is that senior military commanders as well as their political superiors may conclude that their military is capable of defeating other regional fighting forces.
In both conflicts the Russian military has had scant opposition so any overall assessment of its capabilities must be viewed through that prism.
The 2014 annexation of Crimea and the ongoing civil war in Syria, while major political crises, also are replete with insights about the current state of the Russian military.
First, the Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s disdain for Barack Obama is palpable. If the Russian president continues to judge that Obama has no stomach for the fight, it is not implausible that Russia might challenge the West again elsewhere, possibly in the Baltic.
Conducting military operations on a third front would be a major challenge for Russian forces. Nonetheless, it also could trigger a new crisis as consequential as events in Syria, bringing a possible direct clash between NATO and Russian forces.
At a time when both the United States and its most powerful NATO ally, Great Britain, are suffering severe budgetary declines and diminished capabilities while saddled with timid political leadership, the Russian military is riding the crest of a wave changing the political dynamics in areas critical to U.S. national security.
Four lessons about the current state of the Russian military can be gleaned from its recent performance in Ukraine and Syria.
1) The conflicts illustrate that Russian President Vladimir Putin views his military as an instrument of state power.
War is both an extension and consequence of politics. Putin understands this.
Largely unsaddled by and often disdainful of domestic public opinion, the Russian president has moved aggressively to advance Russian interests in Ukraine and Syria by unleashing his military in both conflicts.
Putin realizes that political goals often are best advanced when backed by military prowess. The Russian military has been called to serve as an instrument of state power.
In contrast, and with the exception of a small deployment of fighter aircraft to Turkey, U.S. President Barack Obama has largely sidelined the U.S. military during both crises, deciding in the words of Mideast expert Dennis Ross, that “he (Obama) was not going to get involved in someone else’s civil war.”
2) The Russian military has reversed a decades-long decline.
Beginning with the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union and extending about twenty years, the Russian military suffered sharp declines in funding, morale and overall military capability.
Putin vowed in several political campaigns, including the 2012 presidential election, to restore the military — long revered in Russia — and has carried out that promise with expanded funding and strong political support.
Those investments are paying dividends. In Ukraine, Russian military forces and those supported by them — the so-called “little green men” — conducted military operations with precision, used advanced small arms equipment, and demonstrated improved command, control and communications, a problem that plagued their August 2008 operations against Georgia.
Nonetheless, the decline has not been fully reversed. Russian aircraft conducting front line operations include fighters that are at least 25 years old although they are still potent in the face of very little opposition from air or ground.
At the same time, Russia also is deploying a new generation of fighter aircraft, the SU-34 Fullback fighter bomber.
3) The military fights as it practices.
The Soviet and now Russian military has a long tradition of carrying out numerous peacetime military exercises which serve as a proving ground for the strategies and tactics it is likely to use in wartime.
Advanced militaries around the globe carry out similar training but senior Russian military commanders probably devote more time and attention to training than any other military force.
Russian commanders also are students of warfare and closely watch how other militaries operate and perform. A large body of military writings, for example, analyzed how the U.S. military operated during the 1991 Desert Storm campaign in the Middle East and used combined arms combat such as mixing ground and air capabilities against enemy forces.
In Syria, Russia has shown a capability to carry out combined arms combat, using Syrian-based fighters aircraft as well as cruise missiles from four naval warships in the Caspian Sea to strike Syrian targets.
4) Russian commanders will learn the lessons from Ukraine and Syria but their political masters may come to dangerous conclusions.
Russian commanders doubtless are monitoring the performance of the men and equipment they have deployed to Ukraine and Syria.
These “real world” lessons will aid in improving future performance. More worrying is that senior military commanders as well as their political superiors may conclude that their military is capable of defeating other regional fighting forces.
In both conflicts the Russian military has had scant opposition so any overall assessment of its capabilities must be viewed through that prism.
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